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PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Carl Tobias t
The public interest litigant is no longer a nascent phenomenon
in American jurisprudence. Born of the need of large numbers of
people who individually lack the economic wherewithal or the logistical capacity to vindicate important social values or their own specific interests through the courts, these litigants now participate
actively in much federal civil litigation: public law litigation., Despite the pervasive presence of public interest litigants, the federal
judiciary has accorded them a mixed reception, particularly when
applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Many federal courts
have applied numerous Rules in ways that disadvantage public interest litigants, especially in contrast to traditional litigants, such as private individuals, corporations, and the government.
These developments were not inevitable. Most of the Rules, as
adopted originally in 1938 and as amended subsequently, did not
anticipate, but were compatible with, public law litigation and public
interest litigants' involvement in federal civil litigation. Indeed, certain ideas underlying the Rules as a set of litigating principles may
have facilitated public law litigation and public interest litigants' expanding participation in civil suits. Nonetheless, a number of
judges has enforced numerous Rules in ways that adversely affect
these litigants and which now constitute a discernible pattern. The
fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules affords an auspicious occasion to explore the federal courts' application of the Rules to public
law litigation and the consequences of that judicial treatment.
The first section of this Article surveys the history of the Rules
and chronicles the rise of public interest litigants and their growing
involvement in federal civil litigation. The review shows that nearly
t Professor of Law, University of Montana. Thanks to Rich Freer, Bill Luneburg,
Rick Marcus, Michael Risinger, Peggy Sanner, and Allan Stein for valuable suggestions,
to Brenda Numerof and Kathy Rightmyer for helpful research assistance, to the Harris
Trust for generous continuing support, and to Violet Pasha for typing this Article. Errors that remain are mine.
I
Public law litigation comprises lawsuits which seek to vindicate important social
values that affect numerous individuals and entities. For discussion of much of this litigation's salient characteristics, see infra notes 54-82 and accompanying text. Public interest litigants are people or entities that pursue such litigation. For helpful, recent
analysis of public law litigation and public interest litigants, see N. ARON, LIBERTY AND
JUSTICE FOR ALL PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980s AND BEYOND (1989).
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all of the Rules, as promulgated in 1938 and as revised thereafter,
were consistent with, and even may have promoted, public law litigation and public interest litigants' increasing activity. When the
coalescence of numerous developments significantly transformed
the character of considerable federal civil litigation, federal courts
confronted many unforeseeable issues for whose resolution the
Rules afforded little guidance. The second part of the Article,
therefore, analyzes how the federal judiciary has addressed a
number of these issues. The evaluation reveals that many courts
have enforced numerous Rules in ways that have adversely affected
public interest litigants. Indeed, application of all these Rules may
have had cumulative impacts and even chilling effects on the litigants. Because the assessment also indicates that courts can and
should enforce the Rules with greater solicitude for public interest
litigants, the final section offers suggestions for so applying them
and for future work on the Federal Rules and public law litigation
2
during the next half-century of the Rules' application.
I
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES AND PUBLIC
LAW LITIGATION

The half-century history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
2 I recognize that the advisability and the validity of certain forms of public law
litigation inspire controversy. For discussion of Supreme Court treatment of some of
the litigation, see Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and
the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, Foreword]; Fallon, Of
Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1984). For a thorough list ofcommentary, much ofwhich analyzes the
advisability and validity of public law litigation, see Fallon, supra, at 1 n. 1, 2 n.3. For
representative treatment criticizing the litigation, see generally D. HORowrrz, THE
COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of FederalEquitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978). For representative treatment favoring the
litigation, see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Public Law Litigation]; Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Tenn-Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979). Cf Fletcher, The DiscretionaryConstitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982)
(representative, comparatively neutral treatment). For purposes of this Article, it is
preferable to leave open the question of legitimacy and to admit that it may be insolvable. This approach does not purport to resolve the very proposition some have contended must be proved, and cogent arguments against the validity of public law
litigation have been posited. Barring dramatic reversals on the order of Congressional
repeal of the civil rights laws, however, litigants will not cease seeking to vindicate important social values implicated by the litigation and judges will not stop entertaining
those suits. Thus, it is realistic to assume that some public law litigation will be pursued
and to explore how it might be treated most efficaciously. One need not necessarily
favor such litigation to support its effective resolution when the litigation instituted.
This study and the work proposed for the future, by collecting and analyzing data,
should contribute to more informed debate while indicating contexts in which public law
litigation is more or less advisable and perhaps inappropriate.
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divides into four time frames for the purpose of examining developments relevant to the Federal Rules and public law litigation. The
first period includes the events leading to, and attending, the adoption of the Rules in 1938. The second period encompasses the initial quarter-century of experience with application of the Rules.
The third period involves the developments contributing to the rise
and growth of public law litigation-essentially from the mid-1960s
until the mid-1970s. The fourth period includes events leading to
the expansion of public law litigation and the responses to that increase, including the perceived "litigation explosion," by those responsible for drafting and applying the Rules.
A.

Adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938 and a Look at
Public Law Litigation

The events preceding and accompanying the promulgation of
the Federal Rules in 1938 warrant considerable examination.3 Recent research has expanded substantially understanding of these developments; 4 the events have significant implications for what
happened subsequently. During the early twentieth century, increasing disenchantment with common law and code practice and
procedure prompted widespread calls for procedural reform. 5 Beginning approximately with Roscoe Pound's 1906 address to the
American Bar Association (ABA), entitled "The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Justice,"' 6 support for
procedural change gradually grew. It is important to understand,
however, that numerous advocates were united only by the desire
for some change. 7 The proponents held quite diverse views on the
3 For discussion of developments leading to and surrounding adoption of the
Rules in 1938, I rely most below on Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions
of Ideal Lawsuit Structure From The Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1
(1989); Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015 (1982); Resnik,
FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 494 (1986); Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedure in HistoricalPerspective, 135
U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987).
4 Recent valuable work is cited supra note 3. Although it has expanded understanding, this does not necessarily mean that the work is consistent. Total reconciliation
is not attempted here; rather, I provide multiple "accounts" of the history.
5 For analysis of these developments and those that preceded them, see Bone,
supra note 3, at 3-114; Burbank, supra note 3, at 1035-48; Subrin, David Dudley Field and
the Field Code: A HistoricalAnalysis of an Earlier Procedural I'ision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311
(1988); Subrin, supra note 3, at 914-21, 926-61.
6 See The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice, 29
A.B.A. Rep. 395, 409-13 (1906) [hereinafter A.B.A. Rep.]. This is a rough approximation of time; Professor Pound's address was not the sole cause of what happened. For
more discussion of the developments, see sources cited supra note 5.
7 Champions of reform eventually included such disparate luminaries of the American legal community as Pound; William Howard Taft, ChiefJustice of the United States
Supreme Court; Thomas Shelton. a Virginia business lawyer who was the first head of
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forms that such reform might take, and these perspectives ranged
across a broad spectrum:
Ironically, many strands of the ideology of conservatives who
initially sponsored the [statute authorizing adoption of the Rules]
coalesced with the ideas of liberals who later participated in its
enactment and implementation. This is most notably true with
respect to expanding judicial power, trusting experts, their lack of
8
faith in juries, and their overall attraction to equity practice.
Thus, a reform having conservative political origins came to
fruition as "New Deal, liberal legislation" 9 when Congress passed
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.10 That statute authorized the
Supreme Court to promulgate Rules of procedure (subject to Congressional disapproval) governing resolution of civil litigation in the
federal district courts."I In 1935, the Court appointed the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules (Advisory Committee), whose Reporter was Charles Clark, and which included four additional faculty
members from elite law schools as well as nine attorneys, nearly all
of whom practiced in large private law firms and were active in the
ABA or the American Law Institute.1 2 The Advisory Committee began drafting the Rules that year and submitted its proposals in 1937
to the Supreme Court. 13 The Court, minimally changing the Committee's work, transmitted the Rules as modified in December to the
Attorney General, who tendered them in January 1938 to Congress,
and the proposals became effective "by congressional inaction" that
14
September.
In formulating the Federal Rules, the Advisory Committee apparently had certain objectives for the Rules as a general set of litigating principles and with respect to some specific procedural areas
the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure; and Charles Clark, Dean of the
Yale Law School. See Subrin, supra note 3, at 944-73 (analysis of the growing support for
reform and the role that each person played). Cf Burbank, supra note 3, at 1045-98
(analysis of background developments).
8
Subrin, supra note 3, at 969 (citations omitted).
9 Id at 944.
10 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1988 amendment). Cf Burbank, supra note 3, at
1045-98 (exhaustive analysis of events leading to passage).
11 See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1098-1184 (reinterpreting the statute in light of pre1934 history).
12 For analysis of Clark, and other members of the Advisory Committee, as well as
their viewpoints, see Resnik, supra note 3, at 498-507; Subrin, supra note 3, at 961-82.
See also Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 433 (1986) (for more discussion of Clark's views); Smith,Judge CharlesE.
Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 YALE L.J. 914 (1976) (same).
13
See Resnik, supra note 3, at 498-515 (analyzing the Committee's work on the proposals); Subrin supra note 3, at 961-83 (same). See also Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power
of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975) (analysis of the
Committee's work from 1938 until 1975).
14
Subrin, supra note 3, at 973. See also Resnik, supra note 3, at 494 n.1.
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and Rules. 15 These objectives are complex, subtle, and potentially
inconsistent-and each procedural field and Rule had its own discrete history.' 6 Nevertheless, it is possible to explore considerations most relevant to later developments, while suggesting a
7
number of plausible accounts of the Advisory Committee's efforts. 1
The Committee intended the Rules as a whole to provide a
"trans-substantive code of procedure . . . procedure generalized
across substantive lines .... ,8s It also meant the Rules to elevate
substance over form or, in Charles Clark's own words, for procedure to become the "Handmaid of Justice."' 9 Numerous procedural areas and Rules, such as the pleading requirements, embodied
what has been "labelled the 'liberal ethos,' in which the preferred
disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure
20
through discovery."
The goals of simplicity and non-technical approaches to procedure resemble the idea of the "liberal ethos." The Advisory Committee's attempt to circumscribe the number of steps in a lawsuit
and the provision for open-ended discovery exemplify these objectives. 2 1 The concept of uniformity among federal district courts, between federal and state courts, and among the states represents a
variation on the idea of simplicity. 22 Implicit in these three kinds of
15 I examine principally below the Rules as a set of litigating principles, supplementing that with analyses of specific procedural areas or Rules when warranted for
purposes of clarifying concepts to be addressed in this Article. There are restrictions on
this endeavor. It relies on secondary, published commentary and certain Rules. There
are also limits to historical inquiry, such as attempting to divine the "intent" of fourteen
drafters working 50 years ago, each of whom might have had his own agenda. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 498-99, 508.
16 All of these objectives cannot even be identified. Full analysis of the objectives
that would be a mammoth task which is beyond the scope of this Article and fortunately
unnecessary. For helpful suggestions as to specific Rules and their discrete histories, see
Subrin, supra note 3, at 923.
17 The accounts are overlapping, intertwined, and not totally compatible. I mention some inconsistencies below and attempt to reconcile others.
18 Cover, ForJames Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J.
718 (1975). Accord Resnik, supra note 3, at 512; Subrin, supra note 3, at 944.
19 See C. CLARK, PROCEDURE-THE HANDMAID OFJUSTICE (1965); accord Moore, The
New FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 6 I.C.C. PRACT. J. 41, 42 (1938); Subrin, supra note 3,
at 944.
20 Marcus, supra note 12, at 439.
21 See Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648, 1649-50
(1981) (lawsuit's steps); Resnik, supra note 3, at 500-01 (open-ended discovery); Subrin,
supra note 3, at 977-78 (same). For instance, a lawyer who had filed a pleading with any
"good ground to support it [could] pretty much discover to his or her heart's content."
Subrin, supra, at 1650. This would permit "all available data [to] be laid before the
tribunal trying the case in order to enable it to do justice." Holtzhoff, The Origins and
Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1057, 1060 (1955). The
pleading regime also reflected simple, non-technical approaches, see Marcus, supra note
12, at 439-40.
22 See Subrin, supra note 21, at 1650.
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uniformity was another: a single set of Rules to govern all cases,
meaning that law and equity would be merged. Indeed, Professor
Subrin has convincingly argued that the "underlying philosophy of,
and procedural choices embodied in, the Federal Rules were almost
universally drawn from equity rather than common law" and that
the "Federal Rules went beyond equity's flexibility and permissive23
ness in pleading, joinder, and discovery."
Professor Resnik has stated that contemporaneous commentary
suggests that the drafters acted on a series of assumptions about the
composition of the federal court caseload, the possibilities of professionalism, and the scope of the judicial role. 24 She has observed
that the private damage suit litigated by private attorneys apparently
served as an important paradigm for which the Committee drafted
the Rules. 2 5 According to this view, litigation involves private parties possessing equivalent resources who, with their lawyers, maintain considerable control over the litigation. 2 6 As to the respective
responsibilities and roles of attorneys and judges, the Advisory
Committee seemed to have had abiding faith in the efficacy of adjudicatory procedures and to have relied on the concept of lawyerbased adversarialism. 27 The drafters apparently trusted attorney
self-regulation, especially during pretrial discovery, and endorsed
23
Subrin, supra note 3, at 922 (citations omitted). Cf Clark & Moore,.A New Federal
Civil Procedure-I. The Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 415-35 (1935) (contemporaneous
championing of single set of Rules governing law and equity). "The result is played out
in the Federal Rules in a number of different but interrelated ways: ease of pleading;
broad joinder, expansive discovery; greater judicial power and discretion; flexible remedies; latitude for lawyers; control over juries; reliance on professional experts; reliance
on documentation; and disengagement of substance, procedure, and remedy." Subrin,
supra, at 923-24 (citations omitted). That research also suggests that a procedural system dominated by equity is a mixed blessing. Although equity facilitates the creation of
new rights, it fails to afford efficacious means to vindicate them while contributing to
numerous pressing problems in American civil procedure. See id. at 925-26, 1000-02.
24 See Resnik, supra note 3,at 508.
25
"[O]ne of the prototypical lawsuits for which the 1938 Federal Rules were
designed was the relatively simple diversity case: a dispute between private individuals
or businesses in which tortious injury or breach of contract was claimed, private attorneys were hired to represent the parties, and monetary damages were sought." Id. But
see Subrin, supra note 3, at 973 n.375 (Professor Resnik "severely undervalues" equity's
dominance).
26 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 508-15. Cf In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litigation. 859 F.2d 1007, 1010 (1st Cir. 1988) (parties and counsel set own agenda in
pretrial phase). The private two-party model failed to depict accurately certain statistical
realities of that time, because the "United States was a party in a substantial percentage
of the cases" on the civil docket in the federal courts. Resnik, supra, at 509. Even if the
drafters were aware of this data, they ma, have discounted the information. Much government litigation involved liquor which declined dramatically with prohibition's repeal
and relatively low visibility matters, such as enforcement of the internal revenue laws.
See id. at 508-11.
27 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 508-15.
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increased judicial control, particularly vis-a-vis juries. 28
The history of the Rules does not reveal whether the Advisory
Committee specifically anticipated or intentionally provided for
public law litigation in exactly those forms it now assumes.
Although certain aspects of that history are unclear, the inquiry
should be pursued, because it will shed important light on later developments. In the teens, the three most important forerunners of
modern public interest litigants were litigating cases: 29 legal aid societies established in cities to assist the poor, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). 30 By the late 1920s,
Charles Clark observed that greater emphasis was being "placed
upon the effect of legal rules as instruments of social control of
much wider import than merely as determinants of narrow disputes
between individual litigants." 3' After conducting a 1934 study of
civil litigation in the federal courts, Clark stated that "to a large extent [those] courts may be considered as the courts for adjudicating
various claims involving the central government. This tendency is
certain to increase with all the new and various forms of federal leg32
islation recently passed."
It is important to remember, however, that the individual legal
aid offices, the NAACP, and the ACLU had relatively few resources
and consequently engaged in more limited activities than they
would after 1965. 3 3 Moreover, the 1930s were the time before
See id. at 512-15; 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-

28

§ 5025, at 147-51 (1977) (increased judicial control); Subrin, supra note
21, at 1650 (attorney self-regulation during discovery); Subrin, supra note 3, at 968-73
(increased judicial control).
29
Modern public interest litigants include entities, such as the Sierra Club and the
Health Research Group, which vindicate important social values that affect large numbers of people.
30
See N. ARON, supra note 1,at 6-23; COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 21-57 (1976) [hereinafter BALANCING THE SCALES]; Rabin,
DURE: EVIDENCE

La

.yersfor Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 209-24

(1976).
31
32

Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration, 1 Miss. LJ. 324, 324 (1929).

C. CLARK, REPORT ON CIVIL CASES OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 3-4
(1934). Indeed, Roscoe Pound, as early as his 1906 speech to the ABA, alluded, albeit
obliquely, to the possibility of litigation resembling public law suits, in areas such as
utility rate setting and workers' employment conditions. See A.B.A. Rep., supra note 6.
Professor Chayes suggests that the Advisory Committee intentionally crafted the Rules
to provide for public law suits. See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2. Cf. Subrin,
supra note 3, at 961-73 (suggesting that for Clark one virtue of equity-based procedure
was its ability to accommodate these cases).
33
See Rabin, supra note 30, at 2 14-18. Legal aid societies concentrated their efforts
on the "day-to-day problems of the poor." Houck, With Charityfor All, 93 YALE LJ.
1415, 1440 (1984). Because the NAACP and the ACLU focused on "test cases" to conserve scarce resources, they litigated relatively few cases and even that litigation differed
in certain respects from modern public law litigation. Moreover, labor unions were
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many New Deal statutes were actually implemented, before federal
power became highly centralized, before civil rights litigants were
active, before federal courts evinced hospitality to rights seekers,
before widespread judicial review of federal administrative agency
action, before the 1966 "liberalization" of the class action rule, and
before the "due process" revolution.3 4 In short, the Advisory Committee apparently did not clearly foresee or consciously provide for
public law litigation in the precise forms in which it exists today.
This does not necessarily mean that the drafters' work was irrelevant. Indeed, in light of the Committee's identifiable objectives, the
drafters' efforts probably were compatible with, accommodated, and
35
even facilitated the public law litigation that arose.
B.

The Federal Rules During the First Quarter-Century

The Federal Rules generally worked well and enjoyed a cordial
reception for the first twenty-five years after their adoption in
1938.36 The federal courts successfully applied the Rules, especially
to the private damage suits that comprised a significant percentage
of the federal docket.3 7 The total number of amendments to the
Rules was relatively small. Most of these were "clarifying" amendments; numerous others essentially honored the objectives of those
who drafted the original Rules.3 8 Many states implemented sets of
Rules modeled after the Federal Rules, while nearly all of the other
39
jurisdictions premised particular Rules on the Federal analogues.
Clark undoubtedly was responsible for some of the perceived
practicing a form of group litigation, but it may have been more in the nature of private
litigation, in the sense that many workers primarily pursued their own economic
interests.
34 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 512.
35 Professor Burbank reached a similar conclusion after surveying most of the views
mentioned above. See Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV.
1463, 1468 (1987). Cf Resnik, supra note 3, at 512 n.18 (reaching similar conclusion).
36 See, e.g., 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§ 1008 (2d ed. 1987); Resnik, supra note 3, at 515-17; Subrin, supra note 3, at 910. In the
following analysis, I rely most on Marcus, supra note 12, and Resnik, supra, and on the
primary sources on which they rely.
37 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 515-17. Numerous federal judges warmly praised the
Rules' effectiveness. See Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
435, 445 (1958).
38 See Clark, supra note 37, at 445; Clark, ClarifyingAmendments to the FederalRules, 14
OHIO ST. L.J. 241 (1953) (clarifying amendments); Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural
Rules on FederalJurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 397, 397 n.2 (1976) (few amendments);
Resnik, supra note 3, at 513 (commentary on 1947 debate over Advisory Committee

proposal on work product animated by same assumptions as the original Committee
that proposed Rules).
39 See Clark, supra note 37, at 435; Hazard, UndemocraticLegislation (Book Review), 87
YALE LJ. 1284, 1287 (1978); Subrin, supra note 3, at 910. Cf R. COVER, 0. Fiss &J.
RESNIK, PROCEDURE 1788 (1988) (discussing changes in rulemaking process instituted
under ChiefJustice Warren).

278

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74:270

initial success of the Rules. He served as Reporter for the Advisory
Committee until 1956 and was a member of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1939 until 1959, serving as
Chief Judge for his last five years. 40 Clark's writing, his service as
Reporter, and his membership on an influential court gave him numerous opportunities to influence implementation of the Rules and
to champion certain visions of them.4 ' Clark was not alone, however. The Rules received considerable praise from the bench and
the bar 42 and from numerous writers who appreciated the Rules'
43
benefits and subscribed to the regime they instituted.
There were, of course, some problems with implementation of
the Rules during this period. The liberal pleading system and strategic exploitation of the Rules were especially problematic in complex or protracted litigation. 4 4 Courts and commentators found
that there were difficulties attributable to the character of discovery,
such as overly broad inquiries and judicial reluctance to enforce certain requirements rigorously. 45 Furthermore, some Rules which
have become important to public law litigation, such as Rule 11 governing sanctions and Rule 68 pertaining to offers ofjudgment, fell
into disuse, while others, like Rules 19, 23, and 24 relating to party
46
joinder, were read narrowly.
The antecedents of many of today's public interest litigants
gradually grew from the time the Rules became effective. 4 7 Only in
See Marcus, supra note 12, at 433 n.3.
For example, Clark successfully suppressed a "guerrilla attack" on the 1938
Rules' liberal pleading regime. See Marcus, supra note 12, at 445; Subrin, supra note 3, at
983. Even in 1963, Clark was able to assert that "[n]o criticism of major character now
appears." Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in FederalRule-Making, 46J. AM.JUDICATURE
Soc'y 250, 254 (1963). Cf Smith, supra note 12, at 954-55 (Clark applied the Rules
flexibly, pragmatically, and sensitively, not always implementing his prior views or those
of the Committee).
42
See Clark, supra note 37, at 435, 443. Numerous examples are in the articles in
the symposium The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 435
(1958).
43 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 516; sources cited in note 42 supra.
44 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 12, at 441; Resnik, supra note 3, at 516 n.89; Subrin,
supra note 3, at 982-84 and sources cited therein.
45 See, e.g., New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D.
203, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate PretrialDiscovery, 58 COLUM.
L. REV. 480 (1958). Cf In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d
1007, 1010-11 (1st Cir. 1988) (party/counsel control of pretrial phase generally thought
sufficient after initial rules' adoption but problems with pretrial discovery and complex
litigation soon became clear).
46 See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (pts. I & 2), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 591 (1967-68) (party joinder
Rules read narrowly); Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking"
Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 35 (1976) (Rule 11
disuse); infra notes 241-47 and accompanying text (Rule 68 disuse).
47
Approximately 80 percent of American cities with more than 100,000 residents
40
41
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the 1960s, however, did these entities begin to secure the requisite
resources to support substantial expansion of their operations and
to plan extensively for the type of suits now considered public law
litigation. 48 Many developments that led to the rise of modern public law litigation by the mid-1960s had not occurred or had been
only faintly perceived. For instance, although Judge Jerome Frank
coined the term "private attorney general" in 1943, 4 9 and Congress
passed the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946,50 significant restrictions, such as standing, ripeness, and mootness, impeded those
who sought to challenge governmental activity in the federal courts
throughout most of the twenty-five year period. 5 ' At the end of this
time, Congress, the judiciary, and the Advisory Committee began
52
easing these and other limitations on access to the federal courts 53
and began taking other actions conducive to public law litigation.
C.

The Rise and Growth of Public Law Litigation From the
mid-1960s Until the mid-1970s
1. Institutional Reform Litigation

Between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, numerous developments, some of which already have been mentioned, significantly
changed the nature of considerable federal civil litigation. 54 These
developments include the rise of "institutional reform" or "structural" litigation which differs from, and even reverses, many salient
characteristics of traditional, private, two-party litigation. 55 Because
had legal aid offices by 1958. See Houck, supra note 33, at 1438. The ACLU broadened
significantly the scope of its litigation. See Rabin, supra note 30, at 210-14. The NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund "ran a string of successes through Brown v. Boardof
Education in 1954." See Houck, supra, at 1441.
48 See Houck, supra note 33, at 1439-41; Rabin, supra note 30, at 212, 216-17. Correspondingly, very few of the kind of public interest litigants in substantive areas, such
as environmental protection, which these entities prefigured, had organized or were actively involved in federal civil litigation. See Houck, supra, at 1442-43; Rabin, supra, at
224-27.
49
See Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320
U.S. 707 (1943); f. FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 476-77 (1940)
(endorsing similar concept but not expressly using term).
Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
50
51 These developments are analyzed in ProfessorJaffe's 1965 classic, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINSTRATxVE ACTION. For additional discussion, especially of standing and
challenges to agency decisionmaking, see Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1671-76, 1711-60 (1975); Sunstein, Standing and the
Privitization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1436-38 (1988).
52 See infra notes 83-88, 94-99, 103 and accompanying text.
53
These actions include, for instance, Congressional passage of civil rights and
consumer protection legislation, see infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
54
See Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 6 (concise discussion of these developments); Resnik, supra note 3, at 512 (same). See also Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra
note 2 (more thorough discussion).
55 I rely most here on recent, relevant cases, Chayes, Public Law,Litigation, supra note
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this kind of public law litigation departs so substantially from the
traditional model, 56 and because some have questioned the legitimacy and advisability of institutional litigation,5 7 the litigation deserves thorough examination.
Institutional reform litigation has "sprawling and amorphous"
party structure. 58 Plaintiffs typically pursue relief that could affect
numerous people not before the court as well as institutional, political, and economic structures. 59 Individuals frequently attempt to
litigate their cases as class actions, a development arguably facilitated by the liberalizing 1966 amendment to Rule 23.60 Defendants
generally are large bureaucratic institutions or agencies of the federal, state, or local government, such as prisons or schools. 6 1 The
subject matter of these lawsuits usually is the policy, practice, operation, or decisionmaking of those entities-in essence, a dispute over
the conduct or content of public policy. 6 2 Challenges typically allege violation of a right 63 and urge the judiciary to enunciate and
enforce public policies and values derived from governing constitutional or statutory law. 6 4 Plaintiffs often seek non-monetary, "pro2,the seminal work on such litigation, and the work of Professor Fiss, who has produced
the clearest, most extensive work on such litigation. See, e.g., R. COVER, 0. Fiss & J.
RESNICK, supra note 39; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss,
Against Settlement]; Fiss, The Social and PoliticalFoundations of Adjudication, 6 LAw & HuM.
BEHAV. 121 (1982); Fiss, supra note 2.
56
The illegitimacy of this departure is one important contention of those who criticize the litigation. See, e.g., D. HoRowITz, supra note 2, at 264. Even its most ardent
advocates, such as Professors Chayes and Fiss, admit that the litigation "reverses" crucial characteristics of traditional concepts of adjudication. See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1302; Fiss, supra note 2, at 31.
57
For a representative sample of the literature, see the sources cited supra note 2.
Cf Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 1985) (representative judicial
exposition).
58
Chayes, PublicLaw Litigation, supra note 2, at 1302. Accord Fiss, supra note 2, at 1824. For case examples, see Geier v. Richardson, 871 F.2d 1310, 1311, 1315-17 (6th Cir.
1989); Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 98 F.R.D. 11, 12-13 (E.D. Tex. 1982).
59 See, e.g., Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 344 (6th Cir. 1989); Duran, 760 F.2d at
759. See also Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1302; Fiss, supra note 2, at 1822, 27-28; Fletcher, supra note 2, at 635-41.
60 See, e.g., Hodge v. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 862 F.2d 859, 860 (11 th
Cir. 1989); Lelsz, 98 F.R.D. at 12-13. See also Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 6.
61
See, e.g., Grubbs, 870 F.2d at 344 (state prison system); Geier, 871 F.2d at 1311
(state higher education system). See also Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at
1302; Fallon, supra note 2, at I n.1; Fiss, supra note 2, at 1-3, 18. Of course, there are
exceptions. For example, the institution may be a private entity, like a corporation.
62 See, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 1989)
(police lieutenants' examination); Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521, 1540-42 (9th Cir.
1988) (government decision). See also Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1302;
Fiss, supra note 2, at 4, 9-10, 27-28.
63
See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 2, at 9-10 (right); Fallon, supra note 2, at 3-4 (injury to
interests).
64 See, e.g., City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986) (civil rights plaintiffs vindicate civil and constitutional rights); Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 863 (5th
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spective injunctive relief to prevent continued wrongdoing .... 65
These remedies frequently affect many persons and entities not involved in the suit, require ongoing judicial participation, and are
66
meant to reform the offending institution.
The remedial stage of institutional reform litigation, therefore,
67
is especially likely to differ significantly from private law litigation.
Courts must assemble predictive and legislative facts to formulate,
implement, and monitor complex affirmative decrees governing
large bureaucracies. 68 Performance of these tasks frequently requires novel sources of evidence, new mechanisms, and experimental processes. 6 9 The remedial phase may well evolve into a "long
continuous relationship between the judge and the institution," last70
ing years after the entry of the initial decree.
Judges generally play different, and frequently more active,
roles in institutional reform litigation. Courts often assume greater
responsibility for fact-gathering and analysis and for "determining
Cir. 1987) (Hill, R.M., J., concurring) (courts protect constitutional and statutory
rights). See also Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 2, 58; Fallon, supra note 2, at 1-5.
65 Fallon, supra note 2, at I n.1. See, e.g., Rivera, 477 U.S. at 574 (civil rights plaintiffs vindicate rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms). Accord Chayes,
Public Law Litigation, supra note 2,at 1292-96.
66 See, e.g., Grubbs, 870 F.2d at 344, Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 863. Cf Dan-Cohen, BureaucraticOrganizationsand the Theory ofAdjudication, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) (litigation's
"main point is to shape the form of future transactions and interactions"). See also FalIon, supra note 2, at 4-5; Fiss, supra note 2, at 2-3, 27-28, 36.
67 See, e.g., Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1298-1302; Fiss, supra note
2, at 27-28. The liability stage differs less, although it requires more than a "pronouncement of the legal consequences of past events [and] to some extent a prediction of what
is likely to be in the future." See Chayes, supra, at 1294. For a recent case that affords a
sense of the remedial stage in such litigation and of how it differs from the liability phase
as well as the complex, shifting party alignments in the litigation, see Geier, 871 F.2d at
1311, 1315-17.
68 See, e.g., Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 863. See also Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2,
at 1296-98, 1302; Fiss, supra note 2, at 27-28.
69
Courts may consult informational sources other than the parties, such as parents
of children who are residents in state institutions for persons considered mentally retarded. See, e.g., Lelsz, 98 F.R.D. 11. See also Fiss, supra note 2, at 25-26. Courts may
employ adjuncts to judges, like special masters, to collect and analyze the requisite data
or to promote the negotiation of decrees among litigants. See, e.g., Grubbs, 870 F.2d at
344. See also Berger, Away from the Court House and Into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special
Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978): Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the
Judiciaryor ReshapingAdjudication?, 53 U. CHi. L. REV. 394 (1986); Fiss, supra, at 26-27.
For other mechanisms, see Chayes, Public Law Litigation. supra note 2, at 1300-0 1. Courts
also may apply procedures not ordinarily associated with adjudication, such as forms of
"Alternative Dispute Resolution." See Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 424 (1986). For analysis of this procedure
and other new processes, see McGovern, Toward a FunctionalApproachfor Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. Cm. L. REV. 440 (1986).
70
Fiss, supra note 2, at 27. Accord Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 130102. For examples of litigation now in its twenty-first year, see Geier, 871 F.2d at 1311;
Hodge, 862 F.2d at 860.
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the interests, shaping the issues, and designing the remedies involved in litigation."' 7 ' Somejudges and writers have stated that the
courts may take into account all of the interests influenced by their
decisionmaking, may consider policy arguments in addition to contentions premised on existing rights, and may accord diminished
significance to precedent. 72 Courts are said to perform an "oversight function on behalf of the interests and groups as well as the
individuals affected by the challenged bureaucratic actions," 73 while
the judge purportedly is a public officer "empowered by the political agencies to enforce and create society-wide norms, and perhaps
even restructure institutions, as a way... of giving meaning to our
'74
public values."
2. Public Interest Litigation
"Public interest" litigation resembles, but differs from, institutional reform litigation in certain respects. 75 Public interest litigation vindicates the ideological, political, or moral interests of
numerous persons in attempting to insure that institutions behave
lawfully. 76 One typical and important form of this litigation chal77
lenges the decisionmaking of federal administrative agencies.
During the 1960s, numerous observers with different political per71
Dan-Cohen, supra note 66, at 35. Accord Chayes, PublicLaw Litigation, supra note
2, at 1296-1302; Fallon, supra note 2, at 1-5. Cf Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 863 (judicial
articulation).
72 See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, supra note 66, at 35; Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note
2, at 1289-1302.
73
Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 60. The same writer earlier asserted that "in
actively shaping and monitoring the decree, mediating between the parties, [and] developing his own sources of expertise and information, the trial judge has passed beyond
even the role of the legislator and has become a policy planner and manager." Chayes,
Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1302.
74
Fiss, supra note 2, at 31. The same writer stated more recently that the judicial
duties are to "explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such
as the Constitution... to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with
them." Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 55, at 1095.
75 "Public interest" litigation is the term that I employ; however, it captures concepts drawn principally from the work of Professor Chayes and of the writers in administrative law listed below. See Chayes, Foreword,supra note 2; Chayes, Public Law Litigation,
supra note 2; Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in PublicActions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological
Plaintfl, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Rabin, FederalRegulation in HistoricalPerspective,
38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986); Rabin, supra note 30; Stewart, supra note 51. Cf Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835 (1989) (recent example of public
interest litigation that reached the Supreme Court).
76
SeeJaffe, supra note 75, at 1045-46. Such litigation seeks to "redress injuries not
easily definable in terms of personal, financial loss or other harms actionable at common
law," while plaintiffs do not assert that the "defendant has breached a legal duty running
personally to them." Fallon, supra note 2, at 4.
77 For example, Methow Valley challenged decisionmaking of the United States Forest Service. For thorough treatment of the ideas in the remainder of this paragraph see
Rabin, supra note 75; Stewart, supra note 51. For a concise version, see Tobias, Rule 19
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spectives increasingly criticized the agencies. They claimed that
agencies were "captured" by the very interests they were supposed
to regulate, that agencies failed to achieve the goals for which they
were established, and that agencies were ineffective or unresponsive.78 Many courts, writers, and critics came to perceive considera-

ble agency decisionmaking as an essentially legislative process in
which the perspectives of all affected individuals and interests were
evaluated in making a decision.7 9 That understanding was rendered

problematic, however, because the interests of many persons and
entities were not advocated, much less considered.8 0 Judges responded by relaxing restrictions on public participation in administrative processes and courtroom litigation and by rigorously

analyzing agency decisionmaking. 8 '

Finally, the pursuit of important social values is the unifying
theme of much institutional reform and public interest litigation.
This litigation can also facilitate realization of significant process
values, such as those of a participatory and dignitary nature.8 2

and the Public Rights Exception To PartyJoinder, 65 N.C.L. REV. 745, 754-56 (1987). For
discussion of other forms of public interest litigation, see Fallon, supra note 2, at 3-4.
78
For a comprehensive catalog of these criticisms, see S. BREYER & R. STEWART,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY Poucv ch. 3 (2d ed. 1985). See also Rabin, supra
note 75, at 1266-72.
79 This was an important theme of Professor Stewart's seminal 1975 article. See
Stewart, supra note 51, at 1671-83. Cf Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Civil Aeronautics Bd.,
475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 972 (1975) (judicial articulation
of theme).
80 See Garland, DeregulationandJudicialReview, 98 HARV. L. REV. 507, 577-81 (1985);
Rabin, supra note 75, at 1296-99; Stewart, supra note 51, at 1671-88, 1711-59.
81 For examples of cases relaxing those restrictions, see Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615-17 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 941 (1966). For analysis of case law developments easing the restraints, see Gellhorn, Public Participationin Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 362-69 (1972);
Stewart, supra note 51, at 1723-56; Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1441-51. For examples of
cases calling for rigorous judicial analysis of agency decisionmaking, see Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); Airline
Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 475 F.2d 900, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 972 (1975). For analysis of case law developments requiring rigorous analysis,
see Rabin, supra note 75, at 1300-15; Stewart, supra, at 1756-60, 1781-89. The lower
federal courts even created a private attorney general exception to the American Rule,
thus permitting attorneys' fees to be shifted from defendants to plaintiffs in public law
cases. The Supreme Court, however, halted this development in Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). Congress responded to that determination by passing the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1982).
82
Most of the early literature on process values is excerpted in R. COVER & 0. Fiss,
THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE (1979). Cf Burbank, supra note 35, at 1466-71 (catalog
of later work).
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3. JudicialActivity
Judicial recognition and expansion of substantive rights not
previously acknowledged or extended so broadly were related to the
rise and growth of the two types of public law litigation. 3 The
United States Supreme Court ruled, for instance, that there was a
84
right of privacy that invalidated proscriptions on contraceptives
and on abortions, 85 while it read the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause to require school desegregation 8 6 and reapportionment. 8 7 Correspondingly, the federal judiciary's heightened sensitivity to due process concerns "generated a myriad of
cases involving a kaleidoscopic range of matters that were not within
the standard litigation repertoire [before]-dress and hair codes, academic and government employment status, prisoners' rights, and

welfare benefits ..
4.

."88

CongressionalActivity

Considerable federal legislation implicated most of these developments. 89 During the 1960s and 1970s, the Congress enacted
many statutes90 that some characterized as "social legislation" or
"regulation."
Certain measures proscribed discrimination in education, employment, and housing.9 ' Additional statutes provided
83
In this paragraph, I rely most on Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosauror Phoenix,
69 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Resnik, supra note 3; and relevant cases. Of course, judicial
recognition and expansion of "procedural" rights also contributed to the litigation's rise
and growth. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
84 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
85
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). But cf.Webster v. Reproductive Health
Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989) (characterizing women's right to abortion as a "liberty interest protected by the Due Process clause").
86 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
87 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
88 See Miller, supra note 83, at 6. This sensitivity reflected a revolution in thinking
about entitlements and private rights typified by cases, such as Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970), and writing, like Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964). Indeed, the Supreme Court, in deciding important cases involving civil, administrative,
and criminal procedure in the 1960s and early 1970s, evinced a view of adjudication that
comported with important objectives embodied in the original Rules, such as lawyerbased adversarialism. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 516.
89 For thorough treatment of the legislative activity, see Rabin, supra note 75, at
1278-95. For more concise treatment, see Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 6; Miller,
supra note 83, at 5.
90 For discussions of "social legislation," see Vogel, The "New" Social Regulation in
Historicaland ComparativePerspective, in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS
155 (T.McGraw ed. 1981); Lilley & Miller, The New "Social Regulation," 47 PuB. INTEREST
49 (Spring 1977). Cf R. LrrAN & W. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL REGULATION 44
(1983) (observing that 40 major statutes were enacted).
91 See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-e17
(1982).
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for environmental preservation and pollution control 92 and sought
to protect consumers from unsafe products and from unfair commercial practices. 9 3 A number of enactments encouraged suit by
their intended beneficiaries, such as those individuals or groups
subjected to discrimination. Many measures liberally granted standing or authorized "citizen suits," 94 while others provided for awards
of attorneys' fees. 9 5 Moreover, much legislation mandated or invited affirmative judicial enforcement. 9 6 In fact, the Civil Rights Act
of 196497 and the Voting Rights Act of 196598 were responsible for
the twenty-five fold increase in the number of civil rights filings between 1960 and 1972. 99
5.

The Rules

The role of the Rules in the rise and expansion of public law
litigation between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s is unclear. For
most of this decade, the Rules continued to enjoy good, albeit less
glowing, press and continued to function reasonably well.10 0 There
were comparatively few amendments to the Rules; a small number
was substantive and most embodied the objectives of the 1938 drafters.10 1 For example, even the "significant" 1970 amendments to
the discovery provisions left the image of attorney control and cooperation essentially intact.10 2 Certain changes made the Rules more
flexible and permissive than before. Although the 1966 amendments governing compulsory party joinder, class actions, and intervention clearly liberalized these Rules, their importance to public
92

See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-34

(1982).
93

See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-83 (1982 & Supp. III

1985).
94 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1983); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (1986).
95 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43 (1985) (Appendix to opinion of Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (comprehensive compendium of fee-shifting legislation). Cf Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public
Participantsin Administrative Proceedings, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 906 (1982) (agency payment to
public for costs incurred when participating in administrative proceedings).
96 See Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 6; Fallon, supra note 2, at 3.
97 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1982)).
98 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1
(1982)).
99 See Miller, supra note 83, at 5 (citation omitted).
100 See Cover, supra note 18, at 718; Hazard, supra note 39, at 1287; Resnik, supra
note 3, at 515-16. The two major treatises in the civil procedure field, those of Professor
Moore and of Professors Wright and Miller, maintained before the bench and bar a
"vision of the Federal Rules as a coherent structure" while embracing the "flexibility of
application" that permitted the Rules to serve numerous purposes. See Cover, supra, at
718.
101 See Goldberg, supra note 38, at 397 n.2 (few amendments).
102 See Miller, supra note 83, at 14-15.
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law litigation may have been overstated. 0 3
Some observers recognized that there were difficulties with the
Rules as written and applied. Most of the problems in application
witnessed during the first quarter-century intensified in the mid1970s. 10 4 New difficulties, such as excesses in attorney use, and judicial implementation, of the class action device, also arose. 0 5 The
greater number and complexity of civil suits caused mounting concern.' 0 6 Moreover, certain perceived benefits of the Rules came to
be seen as disadvantages, perhaps reflecting broadening disenchant10 7
ment with some choices of the original drafters.
It now appears most accurate that the Rules in conjunction with
the developments examined above 0 8 afforded a congenial environment in which public law litigation could flourish.' 0 9 The Rules and
those developments apparently reflect a transformation in the conceptualization of certain litigation and many of its components, including the interest needed to initiate and impose liability in a
lawsuit, the subject matter of a lawsuit, and the party structure, as
well as the relief afforded and the role of judges in resolving disputes. 110 To be sure, the liberal ethos pervading the Rules as a
whole and the liberality and flexibility that equity fostered in specific
103
For numerous examples of overstatement in the class action context, see Miller,
Of FrankensteinMonsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality and the "Class Action Problem,"92
HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979). Cf Burbank, supra note 35, at 1479 ("the 1966 amendments
made the triumph [of equity] complete").
104 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. This was especially true of discovery. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975);
Brazil, The Adversay Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposalsfor Change, 31

VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978).
105 See Miller, supra note 103, at 676-79 (describing these excesses).
106 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 440-44 (discussing pressures of managing litigation

and increasing focus on discovery); Miller, supra note 83, at 2-3, 14-15 (discussing the
litigation explosion and the need to control the pretrial process); Resnik, supra note 3, at
520.21, 524-26 (relevant data).
107
This was true of the liberal pleading regime and attorney control over the pretrial process. See Miller, supra note 83, at 8-9, 14-15; Resnik, supra note 3, at 520-25.
108 See supra notes 54-99 and accompanying text.
109
This is not to say that public law litigation was predominant even at its apogee.
This issue remains controversial, however, and its resolution depends substantially on
how one defines such litigation. Compare Burbank, supra note 35, at 1468 (suggesting
phenomenon never the norm) with Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 55, at 1087 (suggesting predominant form of litigation today). For more discussion, relevant data, and
some attempts at resolution, see infra notes 154-59, 164 & 415 and accompanying text.
110 For instance, when a dispute over public policy is considered the subject matter
of litigation, or a moral interest is considered adequate to intervene in a case, those
concepts are much different than subject matter and interest as traditionally understood
in private law suits. See United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir.
1989) (police lieutenants' examination subject matter and confident expectation of
promotion to rank of lieutenant sufficient interest). Cf supra notes 58-76 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 402 (more discussion of transformed
conceptualizations).
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Rules enabled public interest litigants to institute suit, successfully

resist preliminary motions, conduct broad discovery, and reach the
merits of their claims. Moreover, equity underlies numerous procedural measures employed in public law litigation, particularly when
judges fashion a remedy in institutional litigation. 1 ' Equity also
"emphasized joining all relevant parties and issues, amassing all relevant data, and permitting the chancellor, with a good deal of discretion, to order what was fair and just.""12 On balance, it was the
Rules, together with the developments enumerated, that made possible the rise and growth of public law litigation from the mid-1960s
to the mid-1970s.
D.

Public Law Litigation and the Rules Since the Mid-1970s

Numerous complex and occasionally inconsistent developments
relevant to public law litigation and to the Rules have occurred since
the mid-1970s." 3 The recent nature of these developments makes
it difficult to secure sufficient perspective to afford a definitive account. It is possible, however, to describe the developments most
important to public law litigation and to the Rules.
First, many perceive that the federal courts are experiencing a
"litigation explosion."' "1 4 Important to this perception is the belief
that litigants and lawyers overuse, misuse, and abuse the civil justice
system.1 1 5 Federal courts purportedly receive an overwhelming
111
See Chayes, PublicLaw Litigation,supra note 2, at 1292-96, 1303; see supra notes 6770 and accompanying text.
112
Subrin, supra note 3, at 968.
S13 In this subsection, I rely substantially on secondary accounts, especially Marcus,
supra note 12; Miller, supra note 83; and Resnik, supra note 3; and on judicial opinions
that help to illustrate relevant concepts.
114
Some observe crises in the adversarial and civil justice systems. These are
closely related, if not identical, to the "litigation explosion" which is the term used here
to describe the phenomena. For concise descriptions which include similar litanies of
the problems, see Marcus, supra note 12, at 440-44; Resnik, supra note 3, at 494-95;
Subrin, supra note 3, at 910-12. The litigation explosion theme was first articulated
clearly and comprehensively in several Supreme Court opinions of the mid-1970s and at
the 1976 National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration ofJustice (The Pound Conference). See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE
FUTURE (A. Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979) [hereinafter THE POUND CONFERENCE]. It has
been elaborated throughout the ensuing period and retains considerable persuasiveness
today. For references to the copious commentary, see the sources cited in Marcus, supra,
at 440-44; Resnik, supra, at 510-12. Professor Resnik traces Supreme Court pronouncements throughout the period. For a recent example, see W. REHNQUIST, 1988 YEAR END
REPORT OF THE CHIEFJUSTICE (1988). Cf. H. REP. No. R. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
23-24, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN NEws 5982, 5983-84 (discussion of
Congressional interest in, and action relating to, litigation explosion).
115
These were the theses of many of the addresses and much of the commentary in
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number of civil filings,1 6 too many of which are said to lack substantive merit or to exploit available procedural mechanisms like discovery for strategic advantage." 7 Of those lawsuits which are more
legitimate, too great a number allegedly are overly complex, involving numerous parties, claims, and issues, and requiring months and
years of pretrial activity." 18 These and other factors 1 9 are taken to
cause unwarranted delay and cost, often perverting, and inhibiting
120
participation in, the civil justice system.
Despite widespread agreement that the number of civil filings
has increased significantly, that a greater percentage of these suits
are complex, and that complicated cases are more difficult to resolve,121 many draw differing inferences from this information.
These opinions range from dire predictions about the death of the
civil justice system as it has existed 122 to optimistic observations that
12 s
increased filings indicate satisfaction with the federal courts.
Writers have debated the nature as well as the implications of the
"explosion." Some have disputed the size and duration of the current "explosion"'' 2 4 and whether "real litigation rates have inTHE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 114. A typical example is Burger, Agenda for 2000
A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, in id. at 23.
116 See Marvell, Caseload Growth-Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151 (1987)
(helpful data); Miller, supra note 83, at 2-3 (helpful data); Resnik, supra note 3, at 525
n. 138 (same). Cf ChiefJudge Motley Describes Court, Career; Reflects on National Impact of
Landmark Cases, Third Branch, Dec. 1985, at 1 (example of judicial concern about increasing caseloads).
117
See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979); National Hockey League
v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); Marcus, supra note 12, at 441-43; Rosenberg
& King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV.
579.
118 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 441-43; Miller, supra note 83, at 6-11; Resnik, supra
note 3, at 521-22, 526. Cf Resnik, supra, at 495 n.6, 521 n.118 (data on time for case
dispositions).
119 One helpful, representative, but less than exhaustive, litany includes the "explosion in substantive law, photocopying, the types and difficulty of issues brought to
courts, the increase in amounts of money involved, and 'the sheer number of parties.''"
Subrin, supra note 3, at 912 (citing R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LmIGATION
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 1-7 (1985)). Accord In re San Juan
Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007, 1011 (1st Cir. 1988); Miller, supra
note 83.
120 See supra note 117; see also Burger, supra note 115, at 31-32.
121 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 116 & 118.
122
This tone appears in numerous addresses and much commentary in THE POUND
CONFERENCE, supra note 114. See, e.g., Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, in id. at 211-12; Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, in id. at
64.
123 See Resnik, supra note 3, at 495 n.6. Opinions also exist in the "middle range,"
such as comparatively unconcerned observations that neither dramatic increases in litigation nor civil delay are unprecedented. See Marcus, supra note 12, at 440 n.46 (numerous sources).
124 See, e.g., M. SELVIN & P. EBENER, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE vi (1984); Ga-
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creased."' 25 Regardless of the reality, the perception that there is
an explosion has led to considerable judicial, Advisory Committee,
and Congressional activity important to public law litigation and the
Rules.
There is a growing sense that the Rules work less effectively
than before.' 26 The liberality and flexibility of the Rules are said to
have made possible an increasing civil caseload, more complex and
time consuming lawsuits, and abuse, manipulation, and exploitation
of the litigation process.' 2 7 Recent concerns reflect disenchantment
with certain objectives, choices, and ideas of the original Advisory
Committee. In retrospect, the Committee seems to have premised
its work on overly optimistic appraisals, unrealistic assessments, and
misplaced trust or naivete.' 28 The drafters' decision to leave the
pretrial process essentially to attorneys illustrates all of these
difficulties:
Given the realities of modem large-scale litigation, the
rulemakers' expectations for a self-executing, cooperative pretrial
lanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 9 (1983);
Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation; 31 UCLA L.
REV. 72 (1983). Professors Schwab and Eisenberg recently found national data and research on an important district to suggest that the image of a civil rights litigation explosion is overstated and borders on myth. See Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of
ConstitutionalTort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 642, 642-43 (1987). See also Schwab &
Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorneys Fees Statute
and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719 (1988) (later study essentially
confirms earlier findings).
125 See, e.g., Friedman, The Six Million DollarMan: Litigation and Rights Consciousness in
ModernAmerica, 39 MD. L. REV. 661,663 (1980). Cf Galanter, The Life and Times of the
Big Six; or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 921, 94246 (business contract litigation contributing substantially to so-called litigation explosion). Moreover, minimal data apparently support the allegations of abuse, especially in
discovery. See, e.g., Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme CourtAdopts Discovery Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 812-13 (1981); Miller, supra note
103, at 667; Resnik, supra note 3, at 523 n.130; Weinstein, Of Sailing Ships and Seeking
Facts: BriefReflections on Magistrates and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 429, 439 (1988).
126
I rely most in this paragraph on Miller, supra note 83; Resnik, supra note 3; Subrin, supra note 3; and Subrin, supra note 21.
127
See Marcus, supra note 12, at 441-43; Miller, supra note 83. Cf ACF Indus., Inc. v.
EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1086-88 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(increasing discovery abuse).
128
The drafters' faith that adjudication would lead to truth and that more process
would yield the best, or at least better, outcomes illustrates their undue optimism. See
Resnik, supra note 3; see also Marcus, supra note 12, at 492; Subrin, supra note 2 1, at 1650.
The view that procedure could be divorced totally from substance demonstrates their
lack of realism. See Subrin, supra, at 1652; see also Burbank, supra note 35, at 1470-75.
The Committee's unrealized hopes that the Rules' provisions for discovery, pretrial conferences and summary judgment would restrict cases' scope and conclude meritless litigation illustrate misplaced trust. See Subrin, supra note 3, at 975-91; see also Miller. supra
note 83, at 14-15.
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phase have proven to be somewhat naive. Attorneys have neither
cooperated voluntarily to move through discovery nor policed
each other by seeking sanctions for abusive discovery tactics.' 29

The drafters' goals of trans-substantive Rules and of uniformity
30
now appear unworkable. i
The ravages of time and unforeseen developments, such as the mobile nature of American society and the
rise of the modern administrative state, have undermined other
choices of the Committee.' 3 ' The Advisory Committee failed to discern certain matters that now seem obvious and was responsible for
omissions and oversights. The 1938 Rules made minimal provision
for settlement, the manner in which ninety-five percent of the cases
13 2
filed today are resolved.

Courts, the Advisory Committee, and Congress have responded
to the litigation explosion and litigation abuse by attempting to discourage filing, to facilitate expeditious resolution of suits, and to
punish lawyer misconduct. As early as 1975, the Supreme Court
warned lower federal courts about misuse of the litigation process
by attorneys with frivolous claims and soon thereafter encouraged
judges to impose sanctions to deter abuse of discovery.' i 3 The
Court has admonished lower courts to exercise "restraint" in resolving threshold issues, such as standing, 3 4 and in considering imposition of relief while evincing such restraint itself in appropriate
cases.135
Since the mid-1970s, numerous district courts have practiced
129

Miller, supra note 83, at 15. The example also shows how some choices created

conflicts-such as that between lawyer obligations to clients to be zealous advocates and
to courts to insure smooth pretrial processes-and facilitated the subversion of objectives embodied in other choices.
130
See Resnik, supra note 3, at 547-48; Subrin, supra note 3, at 985-91; Subrin, supra
note 21, at 1650-51. Cf Burbank, supra note 35, at 1474 (many current Rules "authorize
essentially ad hoc decisions and therefore are trans-substantive in only the most trivial
sense"). Similarly, simple non-technical approaches seem insufficiently responsive to
numerous demands of modern litigation, especially those posed by complex cases.
'3'
Cf Resnik, supra note 3, at 502 n.30 (difficulty of anticipating "Calder-like configurations" that pass today as lawsuits).
132
See Resnik, supra note 3, at 498, 520 n. 115.
133
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976). Cf Burger Says Vacancies Add to Judicial Deficit, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1985, at 12, col. 1 (Chief
Justice urged more frequent imposition of sanctions in annual report to the judiciary);
supra note 114 (Congressional response).
134
For analysis of standing and citations to the relevant cases, see Chayes, Foreword,
supra note 2, at 8-26; Fallon, supra note 2, at 13-59; Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF.
L. REV. 68 (1984); Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1451-61.
135
See Lyons v. City of Los Angeles, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (example implicating standing and relief). For analysis of the admonitions and citations to the relevant cases, see
Chayes, Foreword,supra note 2, at 45-56; Fallon, supra note 2, at 59-74. Indeed, the Court
may be manipulating resolution of the threshold questions to avoid reaching remedial
issues. See Chayes, supra, at 52-56; Fallon, supra, at 5.
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"managerial judging."13 6 The courts have assumed more active
roles in expediting the resolution of cases by employing pretrial
conferences to set the pace of litigation, to structure issues, or to
encourage settlement; by imposing restrictions on the scope and
timing of discovery; and by levying sanctions for attorney abuse of
the litigation process.' 3 7 Many judges have experimented with Alternative Dispute Resolution, while others have created new procedures for complex litigation.' 3 8 Most managerial judging has
proceeded informally, but some has been conducted pursuant to recently promulgated local Rules.' 3 9 The 1983 amendments to the
Federal Rules and the second edition of the Manual for Complex
Litigation formalized nearly all of the managerial practices
140
followed.
Although certain 1980 amendments of the Rules were intended
to limit attorney abuse of the discovery process,141 the 1983 amendments to Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26 sought to increase the responsibilities of attorneys, to enhance judicial control and management of
litigation, to, improve discovery, and to require imposition of sanc136 Valuable early studies include S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (1977) and Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96

HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982). Cf Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to ProfessorResnik, 35
HASTINGS LJ. 505 (1984) (providing another view of managerial judging's efficacy). Cf
Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 647, 675-78
(1988) (recent analysis).
137 See, e.g. Peckham, The FederalJudge ai a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a
Casefrom Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 70 (1981); Resnik, supra note 136, at 391400.
138 See generally Lieberman & Henry, supra note 69 (analysis of Alternative Dispute
Resolution); Resnik, supra note 3, at 534-36 (same). For discussion of some of the new
procedures, see E. LIND &J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN
THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983); Resnik, supra, at 527, 534-36; Sander, Varieties

of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976); Lambros & Shunk, The SummaryJury Trial, 29
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 43 (1980).

139 See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 857 F.2d 1007, 1011 (1st
Cir. 1988) (bench relied on inherent powers to take more active approach to management of pending litigation); Cohn, FederalDiscovery: A Survey of Local Rules and Practicesin
View of Proposed Changes in the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L. REV. 253 (1979) (managerial
judging pursuant to local Rules); H.R. REP. No. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-29
(1988), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5982, 5987-89 (discussion of difficulties local Rules' proliferation has created, ongoing study of local Rules, and of efforts
to reduce conflicts between local and national Rules and to open local rule making
processes); Coquilette, Squiers & Subrin, The Role of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62 (Jan.
1989) (analysis by authors of local Rules study).
140 See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983),
and the Manual for Complex Litigation, Second (1985).
141 See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980).
Three Justices dissented from the order adopting the amendments because of their belief that the alterations would not prevent abuse and that "Congress' acceptance of these
tinkering changes [would] delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms."
Id. at 1000.
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tions when proper.1 4 2 Rule 16 increases the district courts' power
to manage lawsuits by employing pretrial conferences143 and scheduling orders 44 and by imposing sanctions for violations of certain
requirements.' 4 5 Amended Rule 26 authorizes similar changes in
discovery, empowering judges to restrict discovery in specific circumstances and to impose mandatory sanctions.14 6 Amended Rule
11 supplements the provisions for managerial judging in Rules 16
and 26 by requiring compulsory imposition of sanctions for failure
to conduct reasonable pre-filing inquiries and demands greater re14 7
sponsibility and accountability from attorneys.
These developments, especially the 1983 amendments and the
rise of managerial judging, depart significantly from the objectives
and choices of the original Advisory Committee, changing and even
reversing the initial work.14 8 Certain changes apparently attempt to
142

See Order, supra note 140. For helpful discussions of the amendments, see A.

MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOT-

(1984); Hall, New Rules
Amendments Are FarReaching, 69 A.B.A.J. 1640 (1983). The amendment of Rule 7 merely
makes motions subject to Rule I I's requirements and will only be treated in this Article
in conjunction with Rule 11.
143
See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c). Matters appropriate for discussion at such conferences
include issue formulation, advisability of pleading amendments, avoidance of unnecessary proof, and witness and document identification. Particularly important to public
law litigation are the possibilities of settlement, of employing extra-judicial processes to
resolve cases, and of using special procedures to manage suits involving "complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions or unusual proof problems." FED. R. CIV.
P. 16(c)(10). See also McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
ING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY

REV. 818 (1988).
144 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). Within 120 days of filing, thejudge must issue a sched-

uling order imposing time restraints on partyjoinder, amendment of pleadings, submission of motions and completion of hearings and discovery.
145 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f). Sanctions can be imposed upon litigants, attorneys, or
both for failing to appear at, to be prepared for, or to participate in good faith in, pretrial conferences.
146
See Order, supra note 140; FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (judges may limit discovery
found "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative" or "unduly burdensome or expensive"
in light of the needs of the case); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (requiring sanctions when attorneys fail to "reasonably inquire" before filing discovery requests, responses, or
objections).
147
See Order, supra note 140. The Rule states that a lawyer's signature on every
filing, including pleadings, motions, and discovery papers, is a certification that the filing
is premised on "reasonable inquiry," is well-grounded in fact and law, and is not submitted for any inappropriate reason. The Rule requires sanctions for violations of the certification requirements. FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
Closely related to the 1983 amendments were two abortive Advisory Committee
attempts to amend Rule 68 to encourage settlement by permitting sanctions for the
unreasonable rejection of settlement offers. A 1985 Supreme Court case may have effects similar to those intended by the two abortive attempts. See Marek v. Chesny, 473
U.S. 1 (1985); see also infra notes 241-74 and accompanying text.
148
1 rely most in this paragraph on Subrin, supra note 21, at 1650-52. For instance,
Rules 11, 16, and 26 substitute court control for lawyer self-regulation, and Rule 26
limits considerably open-ended discovery. The proliferation of local Rules has under-
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make the Rules work as initially intended or to correct earlier errors
by adopting proposals rejected in 1938.149 Additional developments may be efforts to fill gaps in the original Rules1 50 or may constitute new understandings.' 5 '
Since the mid-1970s, Congress has evinced greater interest in
certain of these issues, interest which culminated in the 1988 passage of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act.' 5 2
That legislation modernizes much court rulemaking, increasing the
processes and openness at all levels of the federal judiciary, while
encouraging expanded experimentation with court-annexed arbitration, a principal form of Alternative Dispute Resolution. 5 3
Public law litigation generally has increased, but the extent and
timing of growth of specific types of public law litigation have varied. Public interest litigation has increased significantly since the
mid-1970s.1 4 Indeed, public interest litigants have become institututionalized participants in administrative proceedings and in courtroom litigation challenging agency activity.' 5 5 Many suits today
mined interfederal district court uniformity, while suggestions in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND (1985) and Rule 16 that several prototypical scheduling orders
be developed for different kinds of cases have reduced intercase uniformity. Similarly,
the rise of managerial judging and its formalization in Rule 16 illustrate attempts to
adjust procedure to specific cases, thus eroding the trans-substantive premise of the
original Rules. Moreover, the plethora of steps in lawsuits authorized by the 1983
amendments seriously threatens the drafters' efforts to simplify litigation.
149
For instance, Rule 16 may be an effort to have pretrial conferences limit the
scope of cases or ferret out meritless actions. The specific provision regarding issue
formulation institutes an ideal similar to one suggested by Clark in 1935 but rejected by
the Committee. See Subrin, supra note 3, at 978-79.
150
This appears true of Rule 16's reference to settlement. See Resnik, supra note 3,
at 496, 527.
151
For example, the 1983 amendments candidly recognize that substance and procedure are inseparable. See Subrin, supra note 21. at 1650-51. For a valuable sense of
changed conceptualizations of the judiciary's responsibilities for case management in
the concrete context of application of Rules 16 and 26, see In re San Juan Dupont Plaza
Hotel Fire Litigation, 857 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (Ist Cir. 1988).
152 See PUB. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642. Cf H.R. REP. No. 100-889, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 22-27 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5982,
5983-87 (discussion of growing Congressional interest, including increased intervention
in rulemaking). During the relevant period, there have been criticisms and suggestions
for reform of the rulemaking process. See, e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULEMAKING PROCEDURES (1977); Lesnick, The FederalRule-Making Process: A Timefor Re-examination, 61 A.B.A.J. 579 (1975). But see Hazard, supra note 39, at 1287-94.
153 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074, 2077 (1988) (provisions modernizing rulemaking);
28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988) (provisions regarding court-annexed arbitration).
154 Increases in public interest litigation are difficult to document accurately because
much relevant data need refinement. See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at
1303. Numerous writers, however, acknowledge that public interest litigation has increased. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 83, at 7; Resnik, supra note 3, at 510-12.
155 Public interest litigants' vindication of substantive and procedural rights afforded
earlier by courts and Congress have contributed to these developments. See supra notes
83-99 and accompanying text.
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contesting administrative decisionmaking have a "tripolar" party
structure comprised of government, regulated interests, and public
interest litigants.' 5 6 The number, size, and types of public interest
litigants, especially those with business or conservative orientations,
have expanded.' 5 7 These litigants have enjoyed considerable success on the merits, winning hundreds of cases, 1 5 8 and in securing
59
attorney fee awards.'
Mass tort litigation has emerged as a new type of public law
litigation since the mid-1970s. t6 0 Much of this litigation involves
compensatory claims of large numbers of plaintiffs allegedly injured
by defective products, such as Agent Orange and the Dalkon
Shield.16 Although certain aspects of mass tort cases resemble private two-party tort suits, they can pose complex party questions relating to plaintiffs, defendants, and absentees 6 2 as well as
complicated issues involving relief.1 63 The comparatively small
156
These cases often involve an even broader array of participants, such as local
citizens or state agencies, especially when the government is charged with responsibility
for enforcing the laws. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S.
370 (1987); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir.

1984).
157
See N. ARON, supra note 1, at 74-78, 115-2 1; Houck, supra note 33 (discussing the
expansion generally and business-oriented entities specifically).
158 Two successes discussed below involve management of public lands. See Conner
v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988); Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803
F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986). Cf Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 705 F.
Supp. 698 (D.C. C. 1989) (recent success). These litigants also have successfully challenged numerous deregulatory initiatives. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New
Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 426 n. 17 (1987) and sources cited therein.
159 Some recent Supreme Court cases suggest that public interest litigants may be
less successful in securing future attorney fee awards. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware
Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987), 478 U.S. 546 (1986). Cf.
Resnik, supra note 3, at 518-19, 31-32 (discussing Court decisions making less attractive
provisions of major fee-shifting legislation); see also infra note 284.
160 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). See Abraham,
Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of 3lass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L.
REV. 845, 849-93 (1987) (salient characteristics of mass torts); Marcus, supra note 136, at
671-75, 692 (analysis of "tort crisis" which now has eclipsed institutional reform litigation in significance); Mullenix, Class Resolution of the .1lass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal
Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1039 (1986) (helpful analysis of mass tort litigation); Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in .11ass Exposure Cases: .4 "'PublicLau" Vision of the Tort
System. 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984) (discussing problems peculiar to mass exposure
accident claims).
161 For helpful examination of those cases, see P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL:
MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1986); S. ENGELMAYER & R. WAGMAN, LORD'S
JUSTICE: ONE JUDGE'S BATTLE TO EXPOSE THE DEADLY DALKON SHIELD I.U.D. (1985).

162 Professor Mullenix, for example, found existing Rule 23 inadequate in such cases
and recommended special federal legislation. See Mullenix supra note 160. Cf Abraham,
supra note 160, at 876-80 (problems with Rule 23's application in mass tort cases). But
cf.A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d at 729-40 (courts increasingly rely on Rule 23 to solve problems
mass tort cases create).
1 3
See Marcus, Apocalypse Now? (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1267 (1987) (discussing problems involved in structuring relief, especially judicial involvement in settle-
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number of mass tort cases concluded to date, their complexity, and
disparate judicial treatment of them make uncertain the future of
mass tort suits.
Institutional reform litigation generally has decreased since the
mid-1970s. It is unclear whether all types of institutional litigation,
however, have declined. The number of civil rights class actions has
plummeted from 1586 in 1975, to 798 in 1980, to 185 in 1986.164
Nonetheless, plaintiffs continue to bring cases seeking reform of entities, such as prisons and schools. One district judge recently entered a far-reaching affirmative decree in a suit involving
discrimination in housing and education by the City of Yonkers,
New York, while a Texas district court ordered the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to revamp its procedures for promoting Hispanics
and members of other minority groups. 16 5 Although it is difficult to
predict the future of institutional litigation, numerous recent devel166
opments suggest that it may be in jeopardy.
Public interest litigants have brought, or sought to participate
in, a growing number of federal civil cases to assert the rights, interests, or viewpoints of large, unorganized groups of people. This acment negotiations, in the Agent Orange case). Cf Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 201-203, 102

Stat. 4646 (1988) (legislation addressing multi-party, multi-forum problems in mass injury cases arising from single incidents, such as that in In re SanJuan Dupont Plaza Hotel
Fire Litigation, 857 F.2d 1007 (1st Cir. 1988)).
164

See The Rise and Fallofthe Class Action Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1988, at C8, col.

1 [hereinafter Class Actions]; cf Galanter, supra note 125, at 946 (class actions fell 73%
from 1976 high of 3,584 to 971 in 1985); Marcus, supra note 136, at 688 (absolute

number of institutional reform cases at height of popularity quite small); Resnik, supra
note 3, at 511 (characterizing "structural reform" cases as "statistical rarities on the
federal docket").
165
See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aft'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987); Judge Orders Sweeping Changes in the FBIs Promotion
System, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
166 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 2, at 5. But cf Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 57
(even a Court opposed to public law litigation is reduced perforce to practicing such
litigation).
Numerous ideas explain the discrepancies observed between public interest and institutional reform litigation (mass tort litigation remains too nascent for comment). For
instance, public interest litigation apparently has increased, because much of it resembles traditional two-party private litigation-except one party is the government-and
has been authorized by earlier statutory or case law. The decline in institutional litigation may be attributable to certain ways in which it contrasts with public interest litigation. For example, the relief sought in much institutional litigation continues to raise
troubling questions of constitutional authority, federalism, and legitimacy. See Ruiz v.
Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 863 (5th Cir. 1987) (Hill, R.M.,J., concurring); Alliance to End
Repression v. City of Chicago, 742 F.2d 1007, 1019 (7th Cir. 1984). Institutional litigation also involves complex, and often intractable, problems, such as the difficulties of
reforming a recalcitrant bureaucracy or of securing resources from fiscally strapped legislatures. For recent cases that afford a sense of these difficulties, see Grubss v. Norris,
870 F.2d 343, 344 (6th Cir. 1989); TwelveJohn Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d
295, 298-301 (D.C. Cir. 1988), United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1538
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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tivity has generated new forms, understandings, relationships, and
difficulties. Indeed, public law litigation may have transformed conventional understandings of adjudication, of the judicial function,
and of the components of a lawsuit. Public law litigation poses
novel procedural difficulties whose resolution has proved problematic under the Federal Rules. The following section examines how
the federal courts have applied numerous Rules to certain difficult
issues that public law litigation raises. This examination should enhance appreciation of these procedural complications while suggesting possible approaches for treating them and promising
avenues for future exploration.
II
JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL RULES

To

PUBLIC LAw LITIGATION

A.

Introduction

Judicial application of numerous Rules has adversely affected
public interest litigants. This section will closely analyze Rule 8
(covering pleading), Rule 11 (governing sanctions), Rule 68 (relating to "offers of judgment" or settlement and payment of costs),
Rule 19 (regarding compulsory joinder of parties), and Rule
24(a)(2) (respecting non-statutory intervention as of right). This
section will also examine briefly the enforcement of other Rules that
have been troubling for public interest litigants. Scrutiny of the application of Rules 8, 11, 19, 24(a)(2) and 68 elucidates concepts integral to public law litigation, particularly those that distinguish it
from private, traditional litigation. Moreover, enforcement of the
five Rules has significance for much public law litigation and considerable reliable data on their application exist. Analysis of these
Rules permits comparatively detailed evaluation, but the five encompass sufficiently diverse procedural fields and are sufficiently
numerous to afford some representativeness and to test out the hypothesis that courts have enforced the Rules in ways problematic for
public interest litigants. Brief examination of other Rules indicates
that the difficulties observed in judicial application of Rules 8, 11,
19, 24, and 68 to public law litigation are not peculiar to those Rules
67
and suggests the existence of a pattern.1
B. Judicial Application of the Rules
1. Federal Rule 8
Rule 8, governing pleading, requires the plaintiff to submit a
167 This Article briefly analyzes the other Rules because less reliable data exists on
their application.
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"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.' 6 8 The Rule was intended to clarify and simplify
pleading practice as it had existed under the codes while generally
deemphasizing the significance of the pleadings.1 69 In 1955, the
Advisory Committee rejected Ninth Circuit proposals that could
have reinstituted code-type pleading, and no serious recommendations for alterations have been made since.1 7 0
In 1957, the
Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on the liberal, flexible pleading regime embodied in the Rules: "[A] complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief."' 17 Thus, the Court rejected fact
pleading, the "bete noir of the codes,"' 17 2 and embraced notice pleading: "[a]ll the Rules require is 'a short and plain statement of the
claim' that will give to defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's
73
claim is and grounds upon which it rests."'
Despite this apparent death knell for pleading practice, "defendants continued to make motions to dismiss and courts continued to grant them."' 74 Moreover, since the 1970s, numerous
judges have imposed more rigorous requirements upon complaints
filed in certain categories of cases, most importantly those alleging
civil rights violations. Today every "circuit has articulated a require75
ment of particularity in pleading for civil rights complaints."'1
168
See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Of course, if plaintiff's complaint fails to meet the Rule's
requirements, defendant can move to have it dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). I rely substantially here on Marcus, supra note 12, and pertinent cases; cf.Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REv. 677
(1984) (heightened pleading requirements in civil rights cases).
169 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 439-40; Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading and
Standing, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 390, 396 (1980). For example, courts are to grant freely
the opportunity to amend a pleading. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b).
170
See Marcus, supra note 12, at 445; Subrin, supra note 3, at 983-84.
171 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (citations omitted).
172
Marcus, supra note 12, at 435.
'73
Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
174 Marcus, supra note 12, at 434. After Conley, however, the "intense academic discussion" of pleadings that preceded it "stopped abruptly." Id.
175
Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., Brennan
v. Hobson, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); accord Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 (5th Cir.
1985). Both of these opinions include comprehensive compilations of the relevant
cases, as does Roberts, supra note 169, at 417-19. Courts have required specificity in
several other areas, including cases that implicate governmental officials' immunity. See,
e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978) (warning lower federal courts of
"artful pleading" and suggesting dismissal of complaints that fail to state compensable
claim under Constitution); accord Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1479. Another area treated minimally here is complaints alleging conspiracies. See, e.g., Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d
1216, 1217 (9th Cir. 1977); Marcus, supra note 12, at 450. Most of the cases assessed
here come under the generic rubric of civil rights, a number of which invoke 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Cf International Caucus of Labor Comms. v. City of Chicago, 816 F.2d 337,
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Numerous courts have found insufficient civil rights complaints
that include vague, speculative, or conclusory allegations and have
demanded factual specificity concerning the behavior, especially
motive and intent, alleged to have contravened plaintiffs' rights.
The Third Circuit, perhaps in the vanguard of this development, has
specified the requirements that civil rights plaintiffs must satisfy.' 76
For example, this court has stated that a civil rights complaint will
be dismissed if it "does not in any manner allege facts showing a
nexus between acts of racial discrimination and the named individual defendants"' 7 7 or it if does not "identify the particular conduct
of defendants that is alleged to have harmed the plaintiffs."' 178 The
Third Circuit also recently observed that the "crucial questions are
whether sufficient facts are pleaded to determine that the complaint
is not frivolous and to provide defendants with adequate notice to
179
frame an answer."'
Some courts have been even more demanding, requiring that
there be a factual showing of actual discriminatory intent, that
claims be supported with references to material facts, or that pleadings specify sufficient instances of misbehavior related closely
enough in time to sustain an inference of liability.' 8 0 Certain judges
340 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (application of more rigorous requirements
to complaint alleging First Amendment violation); Marcus, supra, at 44749 (application
of more rigorous requirements to complaints alleging securities fraud).
176 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 449 ("leader in this movement has been the Third
Circuit"). The then-ChiefJudge of the Third Circuit recently acknowledged the court's
"longstanding rule [imposing] a higher standard on civil rights complaints" and selectively reviewed the "long line of cases [establishing] that civil rights deprivations must
be pleaded with more specificity than other civil complaints." District Council 47 v.
Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 316, 317 (3d Cir. 1986) (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
177 United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 205 (3d Cir. 1980); accord
Albany Welfare Rights Org. Day Care Center v. Schreck, 463 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
178
Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646, 650 (3d Cir. 1981); accordDarr v. Wolfe, 767 F.2d
79, 80 (3d Cir. 1985);Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.
1984).
179
Frazier v. Southeastern Pa. Transit Auth., 785 F.2d 65, 68 (3d Cir. 1986). This
articulation, the majority opinion in District Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310 (3d Cir.
1986), Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 1338 (1989), and Freedman v. City of Allentown, Pa., 853 F.2d 1111,
1114-15 (3d Cir. 1988) may reflect a moderating trend in the Third Circuit, although
any apparent moderation may be attributable to the composition of panels or the facts of
specific cases. See Frazier, 785 F.2d at 67-68; cf.Bradley, 795 F.2d at 319 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting) (Bradley "majority interpret[s] . . . four sentences [in Frazier] to eviscerate an
entire line of relevant case law"). Cf.Scott v. Rieht, 690 F. Supp. 369, 370-71 (recent
example of stringent approach's application by district judge in Third Circuit).
180 See Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1978) (requiring
pleadings specifying instances of misbehavior); Slotnick v. Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 33
(1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1978) (requiring references to material facts);
Parish v. N.C.A.A., 506 F.2d 1028. 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1975) (requiring actual discriminatory intent).
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have analyzed complaints to determine whether plaintiffs were likely
to prove their factual conclusions and have dismissed pleadings
found deficient.'"'
One of the first cases imposing stricter pleading requirements
in civil rights litigation articulated most of the reasons still offered
for doing so:
In recent years there has been an increasingly large volume of
cases brought under the Civil Rights Act. A substantial number of
these cases are frivolous or should be litigated in the State courts;
they all cause defendants-public officials, policemen and citizens
alike considerable expense, vexation and perhaps unfounded notoriety. It is an important public policy to weed out the frivolous
and insubstantial cases at an early stage in the litigation, and still
18 2
keep the doors of the federal courts open to legitimate claims.
Numerous courts have adopted one or more of these rationales, and
some judges have embellished the justifications or created others.
The Third Circuit, for instance, has reasoned that requiring greater
specificity in pleadings protects local governments from the threat
of "massive interference" produced by litigation pursued for political harassment as well as protects their "files from overbroad and
irrelevant inquiries"' 8s3 and the police from onerous discovery
requests.
Heightened pleading requirements in civil rights cases contravene the letter and spirit of the Rules' pleading system and other
aspects of the Rules as well as Supreme Court pronouncements.
Federal courts may lack the requisite authority to demand more
stringent pleading in this class of suits. 18 4 The Advisory Committee
explicitly prescribed stricter pleading only in Rule 9, when a plaintiff
alleges fraud,' 8 5 rejected elevated standards and fact pleading when
adopting Rule 8 in 1938, and has modified none of these decisions.18 6 The Committee has also preserved a liberal pleading sys181 See Marcus, supra note 12, at 463-70 (citing Schreck andJones v. Community Redev.
Agency as examples of this phenomenon in context of fact pleading revival). Some federal judges have opposed the adoption of stricter requirements. See, e.g., United States v.
City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d at 207 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); cf. Hobson v. Wilson, 737
F.2d 1, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., Brennan v. Hobson, 470 U.S. 1084
(1985) ("overly rigid application.., could lead to dismissal of meritorious claims").
182
Valley v. Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968) Accord. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d at 649; Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922
(3d Cir. 1976); Schreck, 463 F.2d at 622.
183
See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d at 204-05; cf. Marcus, supra note
12, at 436 (fact pleading is an effort to cope with litigation explosion, open-ended discovery, and limited use of summary judgment).
184
See, e.g., Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1482 (5th Cir. 1985) (Higginbotham, J.,
concurring); Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 925-27 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
185 See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
186 See Elliott, 751 F.2d at 1482 (Higginbotham,J., concurring); United States v. Gus-
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tern which is meant to serve limited functions. When a court
dismisses a civil rights complaint at the pleading stage doubting the
plaintiff's success on the factual merits, the court essentially requires the plaintiff to marshal evidence before discovery. This judicial approach contradicts conventional learning about what
information plaintiff must produce and a court may consider at that
87
stage.'
Even if plaintiffs bring too many frivolous civil rights cases-a
proposition the validity of which has been challengedI 8 8-other
mechanisms enable courts to achieve results similar to those accomplished by heightened pleading requirements. For instance, Rule
56, prescribing summary judgment, is available. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's recent approval of expanded use of Rule 56 and
the increased judicial control over discovery effected by amended
Rule 26 enhance the attractiveness of these alternatives to elevated
pleading requirements. 89
Stringent pleading standards in civil rights actions may have important implications for plaintiffs. They violate tenets of fundamental fairness, imposing upon a whole class of lawsuits and claimants
more onerous demands withoutjustification. These stricter requirements resurrect the rejected regime of fact pleading, apply the discredited notion of "disfavored claims" 1 90 to a type of litigation the
Supreme Court has found essential to liberty,' 9 ' and impose burdens on a category of litigants least able to overcome them. Courts
will dismiss numerous civil rights cases earlier in the litigation process than they otherwise might, and some of these dismissals will be
improper. For instance, plaintiffs pursuing civil rights claims typically have substantially less resources and information than governmental defendants. Stringent pleading requirements could
disproportionately affect civil rights litigants by demanding information in their complaints that they lack the money to secure or that
tin-Bacon Div., CertainTeed Prods., 426 F.2d 539, 542-43 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 832 (1970); Thompson v. Village of Evergreen Park, 503 F. Supp. 251, 252 (N.D.
Ill. 1980); see also Wingate, supra note 168, at 692.

187 See, e.g., Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Hill v.
City of Atlanta, 91 F.R.D. 528, 532 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Marcus, supra note 12, at 462-71.
188
See, e.g., Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 927 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Wingate, supra note
168, at 688 (challenging the proposition that civil rights cases are disproportionately
frivolous).
189 See infra notes 368-75 and accompanying text (discussion of Rule 56 indicating
expanded use may pose difficulties for public interest litigants); supra note 146 and accompanying text (Rule 26). Amended Rule 16 (governing pretrial conferences) provides an additional alternative to enhanced pleading requirements.
190 For discussion and criticism of this notion, see Marcus, supra note 12, at 471-73.
191 See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); But cf. infra note 284 (Court's ambivalent civil rights
jurisprudence).
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would only be available upon discovery. Judicial application of the
1983 amendments, especially Rule 11, could have certain similar effects on public interest litigants.
2.

The 1983 Amendments with Special Reference to FederalRule 11

The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules were intended to
increase the accountability of attorneys and judicial control of lawsuits to enhance the discovery process, and to promote the imposition of sanctions when warranted.1 92 Rule 16 permits district judges
to manage litigation more thoroughly, particularly before trial, by
providing for pretrial conferences and scheduling orders.' 9 3 Rule
26 increases judicial control over the discovery process by authorizing limitations on its timing and scope. 19 4 Rule 11 states that an
attorney's signature on a paper constitutes a certification that to the
best of the attorney's "knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose."'' 95 The amendment to Rule 11 also mandates
imposition of sanctions, such as attorneys' fees, for violations of its
provisions.
This subsection will examine the application of Rule 11 in more
detail than the application of the other 1983 revisions. Attorneys'
vigorous use of Rule 11 and its compulsory nature have already led
to approximately 1,000 opinions (and to thousands more that have
not been reported) under the amendment. Numerous writers have
assessed the Rule and have compiled considerable data on its application.' 96 In contrast, Rules 16 and 26 afford fewer opportunities
192 See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983).
For the description of the amendments, I rely on the sources cited in notes 142-47 supra.
For developments subsequent to the August 1983 amendment of Rule 11, I rely most on
S. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANsrrION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE

ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]; Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485 (1988-89); Vairo, Rule 11:
A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988); Note, PlausiblePleadings: Developing Standardsfor
Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987) [hereinafter Plausible Pleadings] and the
reported cases.
193 See FED. R. CiV. P. 16; cf supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (more discussion of amendment).
194 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26; cf supra note 146 and accompanying text (more discussion
of amendment).
195 FED. R. Civ. P. 11. This Article does not examine Rule lI's prohibition upon
papers filed for improper purposes, because few courts have imposed sanctions for the
proscription's violation and it has less potential for chilling public law litigation than the
reasonable prefiling inquiry requirements.
196 See sources cited supra note 192; LaFrance, FederalRule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 331, 332 n.2 (1988). (comprehensive, recent compilation of
additional secondary sources). Moreover, there is a new study conducted under the aus-
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and incentives to invoke their provisions. Judicial activity under
those amendments also is more discretionary and, thus, less likely to
result in orders, much less reported decisions.
It remains too early to ascertain how courts will ultimately apply
Rule 11 or to gauge all of the effects of such enforcement. Moreover, relying on reported opinions warrants considerable caution.
For example, much judicial activity involving Rule 11, even orders
imposing sanctions, has not been reported, while judges writing
opinions calling for sanctions may marshal the facts in ways
favorable to their determinations.1 9 7 Nonetheless, the reported
cases suggest some problematic trends in judicial application of the
Rule. Those opinions can be instructive, as when their very publication is meant to serve as a deterrent. 98
Recently compiled data on reported opinions indicate that
sanctions have been sought from, and imposed upon, plaintiffs in
public law litigation, especially civil rights and employment discrimination litigation, considerably more often than in other kinds of federal civil litigation.' 9 9 Professor Nelken found that "although civil
rights cases accounted for only 7.6% of the civil filings between
1983 and 1985, 22.39% of the Rule 11 cases involve civil rights
claims." 20 0 Professor Vario who surveyed the nearly 700 reported
Rule 11 decisions rendered between August 1, 1983 (the amendment's effective date) and December 15, 1987, offered specific data
regarding cases in which sanctions were requested-and imposed:
pices of the Federal Judicial Center. See T. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS (1988). The "Center for Constitutional Rights [also is preparing to undertake] a

national project to gather information concerning implementation of Rule 11." See
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871 n.4 (5th Cir. 1988); cf.G.JOSEPH,
C. SHAFFER & P. SANDLER, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS (2d ed. 1988) (re-

cent ABA publication surveying developing law of sanctions).
197 See Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the
Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1339-40 (1986) ("without
access to the pleadings, or to the parties' supporting papers, the court's opinion is the
only source from which to discern the issues"). The Third Circuit Task Force which
collected data on all Rule 11 activity for a one year period in the circuit warned that
published opinions are a "hazardous basis for inferring effects," especially when it is
clear that the law is developing and developing differently nationwide and when it is
unclear whether law on the books or on computer is fairly representative of that applied
by district courts. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at 3. For more suggestions

regarding these issues, see id. at 4-6, 44-45, 55-58.
198
A Chicago firm, for instance, reportedly spent thousands of dollars to reverse a
small sanction because of peer pressure and concern for its reputation. See Has the Profession 'sAttempt to Curb Ludicrous Litigation Actually Boomeranged?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1988,
at BI 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Rule 11 Boomerang].
199 I rely in this paragraph on TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192; Nelken, supra
note 197; Vairo, supra note 192.
200 Nelken, supra note 197, at 1327. Professor Nelken also provided data on the
"geography of Rule 1 I,"the circumstances in which parties seek sanctions, and how
courts resolve sanctions issues. Id. at 1326-29.
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Civil rights and employment discrimination cases are the subject
of 28.1% of the Rule 11 cases (191 of the 680 requests). Plaintiffs
are the target of the sanction request in 165 of these cases, 86.4%,
which is somewhat higher than average (78.8%). Plaintiffs are
sanctioned in 71.5% of the cases in which they are the target, a
figure that is a full 17.3% higher than the average for plaintiffs in
all other cases (54.2%). Defendants are targeted in 13.6% of the
cases, and sanctioned in 50% of these cases, but this represents
only 6.8% of all civil rights and employment discrimination
20
cases. 1

The Third Circuit Task Force, which assessed all Rule I I activity in
that circuit from July 1, 1987 through June 30, 1988, provided similar data:
Civil rights and employment discrimination cases account for
18.2% (24/132) of the Rule II motions in the survey [28.1%].
Plaintiffs are the "targets" of 70.8% (17/24) of the motions in
such cases [86.4%], and they are sanctioned pursuant to 47.1%
(8/17) of such motions [71.5%]. [That rate] is considerably
higher than the rate (6/71 or 8.45%) for plaintiffs in non-civil
20 2
rights cases.

Numerous courts' application of amended Rule 11 has jeopardized litigation seeking to vindicate new legal theories, less popular
and test cases as well as suits which plaintiffs cannot easily plead and
prove without data that defendants possess. When treating lawyers'
responsibilities to conduct reasonable pre-filing inquiries into their
cases' legal premises, judges have applied Rule 11 "zealously
against plaintiffs in 'disfavored' lawsuits," many of which have been
characterized as "very close cases." 20 3 For example, the federal juVairo, supra note 192, at 200-0 1. Professor Vairo also provided a "statistical pro201
file of Rule 11," which considers whether the Rule is a defendant's tool, its possible
chilling effect, its growth areas, and the circuit courts' role in enforcement. Id. at 199203. Professor Vairo recently observed that "nothing substantially different has happened" since she completed her study. Telephone conversation with Professor Georgene Vairo, Fordham University, School of Law (Mar. 14, 1989). My own
impressionistic survey of reported opinions and those on Lexis since Professor Vairo
concluded her assessment indicates that the level of Rule 11 activity in civil rights cases
has remained relatively constant, although plaintiffs apparently have been sanctioned at
a some what lower rate. The Third Circuit Task Force found Professor Vairo's statistics
"highly problematic" because of "under-inclusiveness and double-counting" and because of "possible biases in publication practices and possible differential rates of appeal." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at 58.
See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at 59, 69. The Task Force also provided
202
much data and many observations on Rule I I's application which are helpful, because it
conducted the first empirical study of unreported Rule 11 activity.
203
Vairo, supra note 192, at 217; see, e.g., Jennings v. Joshua Independent School
Dist., 869 F.2d 870, 878-79 (5th Cir. 1989); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d
194 (7th Cir. 1985); cf G.JoSEPH, C. SHAFFER & P. SANDLER, supra note 199, at 28-29
(many sanction cases are fact-intensive close calls).
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diciary has enforced this part of the amendment with comparative
stringency in employment discrimination and civil rights litigation,20 4 even though courts generally have treated attorney obligations regarding the law leniently. 20 5 Correspondingly, numerous
courts imposing sanctions in civil rights suits have premised their
decisions on the finding that plaintiffs were pursuing frivolous legal
theories. 20 6 Courts have sanctioned those who bring securities
fraud, RICO, and related trade regulation cases much less often on
this basis, although the law in these fields is only minimally more
unsettled and dynamic than in civil rights. 20 7 A small number of
judges has explicitly recognized these difficulties. For instance,
"some judges are avoiding Rule 11 until 'the line between creativity
and frivolity' is clarified." 20 8 One circuit judge remarked that "due
process, unfortunately, is an area where creativity and frivolity
20 9
sometimes threaten to merge."
Courts in general have assessed more rigorously attorneys' responsibilities to inquire into their suits' factual bases than their legal
premises, while judges have vigorously applied Rule 1I to civil
rights cases, closely scrutinizing their factual bases and the litigants'
pre-filing factual investigations. 21 0 The Seventh Circuit affirmed a
204
See Tobias, supra note 192, at 492. Vairo, supra note 192, at 205. See, e.g., Szabo
Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir. 1987) (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority for "consuming five dense paragraphs" to show plaintiff's due process theory "wacky"), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 110 (1988).
205
Some judges have created a category of "technical" violations which are effectively ignored. E.g., Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1987) (collection of relevant cases); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 918 (1987) (civil rights case in which the court subscribed to technical violation idea
but expressly rejected special treatment of such claims). See generally Vario, supra note
192, at 205, 213-17.
206
See, e.g., Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1091
(3d Cir. 1988); Goldberg v. Weil, 707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. I1. 1989). See Tobias,
supra note 192, at 492; Vairo, supra note 192, at 202; cf PlausiblePleadings,supra note 192,
at 640-42 (examples of judges' conflicting opinions on what constitutes frivolous legal
theory).
207
See Vairo, supra note 192, at 201-02. See, e.g., Morda v. Klein, 865 F.2d 782 (6th
Cir. 1989); Creative Bath Prod. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 837 F.2d 561 (2d Cir.
1988) (recent RICO cases).
208
Rule 11 Boomerang,supra note 198 (quotingJudge Gerard Goettel of the Southern
District of New York).
209
Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1085 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); cf. Woodrum v. Woodward
County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding sanctions' imposition would
operate to chill civil rights plaintiffs who argue in good faith for modification or extension of rights and remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); O'Connell v. Champion Int'l
Corp., 812 F.2d 393, 395 (8th Cir. 1987) (although statute of limitations is good defense
to employment discrimination suit, appellate court defers to district judge's finding that
Rule 11 not violated because plaintiffs had "non-fiivolous legal arguments" for avoiding
limitations bar).
210
See Tobias, supra note 192, at 493; Vairo, supra note 192, at 205, 218-19; Plausible
Pleadings, supra note 192, at 635-37.
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trial court's decision to dismiss a civil rights action and to impose
Rule 11 sanctions because plaintiff's counsel undertook insufficient
factual inquiry and filed a "ponderous, extravagant, and overblown
complaint." 21 ' The circuit court observed that the plaintiff "would
have stated an actionable claim" had he introduced certain facts, but
the plaintiff probably could only have uncovered those facts through
discovery. 2 12 Correspondingly, judicial application of Rule lI 's
"grounded in fact" requirement has had the effect of demanding
increased specificity in pleading, if only to resist potential sanctions
motions. 21 3 The development of elevated fact pleading threatens
the liberal pleading regime of the Rules. It also contravenes the
longstanding understanding that plaintiffs need not adduce at the
pleading stage facts that only may be available after discovery to
which plaintiffs have been entitled. 21 4 Judge Pratt of the Second
Circuit astutely described this "Catch 22": "no information until
litigation, but no litigation without information. ' 21 5 In this situation and numerous others, plaintiffs not only lose their cases but
they or their attorneys also may incur sanctions.
The federal judiciary has offered relatively little justification for
its application of Rule 11. Practically no courts specifically address
the compiled statistical data; only a few mention the treatment of
civil rights litigants. Most judges merely state that they are implementing Rule lI 's purposes, such as deterring frivolous litigation.21 6 Some courts acknowledge that application of the Rule may
pose general problems and difficulties specific to civil rights cases.
Several judges, in the context of civil rights cases, express rather
general concern that abuse of Rule 11 could "stifle the creativity of
Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 206 (quoting the district court's opinion).
Rodgers, 771 F.2d at 205-08 (facts concerning police officer's intent and governmental policies).
213
See Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 1986); Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 596 F. Supp. 13, 20 (N.D. Ill.
1984). Judge Easterbrook, the author of Szabo,
stated that it is not permissible to file suit and use discovery as the sole means of determining whether plaintiff has a case. See 823 F.2d at 1083. He later seems to have moderated that view by observing that Rule 11 does not modify the "'notice pleading'
approach of the federal rules." See Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d
1063, 1073 (7th Cir. 1987). See generally Tobias, supra note 192, at 493-95 (more discussion of this and related issues examined in remainder of this paragraph).
214
See Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1279; Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11th Cir.
1987). Thus, plaintiffs could be disadvantaged similarly to the ways they are by judicial
application of Rule 8. See supra notes 168-91 and accompanying text.
215 Johnson byJohnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1986) (Pratt, J.,
dissenting) cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986). For analysis indicating that judicial decisions actually imposing sanctions have disadvantaged civil rights plaintiffs nearly as
much as determinations finding them in violation of Rule 11, see Tobias, supra note 192,
at 498-501.
216 See, e.g., Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1082; Johnson, 788 F.2d at 854; Lepucki v. Van
Wormer, 765 F.2d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1985).
2i 1
212
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litigants in pursuing novel factual or legal theories" 21 7 while a few
judges state that the imposition of sanctions might preclude access
to the courts for civil rights plaintiffs. 2 18 Somejudges urge caution
2 19
in applying the Rule to civil rights suits.
Judicial application of Rule 11 since its 1983 amendment has
had numerous adverse implications, especially for civil rights plaintiffs. The frequency with which courts have imposed Rule 11 sanctions in civil rights cases has effectively revitalized the antiquated
notion of "disfavored" claims. 220 This result contravenes Supreme
Court pronouncements as well as.Congressional substantive, procedural, and fee-shifting legislation indicating that civil rights litigation should receive solicitous judicial treatment. 22 1 Judicial
application of Rule 11 has eroded basic understandings reflected in
the 1938 Rules, such as liberal pleading and the predisposition to
resolve disputes on the merits. 22 2 Some commentators fear that
placing "excessive emphasis on sanctions may lead to the greatest
evil of the past-the prospect of too many cases being dismissed or
litigated with little regard to the merits." 22 3 Indeed, Judge Cudahy,
when dissenting from a decision to remand for fact-finding on the
Rule 1 issue, perceptively wondered whether the circuit panel appeared "almost at the point of saying that the main question before
the court is not 'Are you right?' but 'Are you sanctionable?' "224
Such judicial application makes civil rights plaintiffs and their
counsel particularly vulnerable to Rule 11 sanctions. Public law
suits look and are less traditional and pose more difficult problems
217
Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 885 (5th Cir. 1988); see also
Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1561.
218
See Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1127; Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 903 (10th Cir.
1986).
219
See Davis v. Crush, 862 F.2d 84, 92 (6th Cir. 1988); Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1085-86
(Cudahy, J., dissenting). Increased solicitude for civil rights and employment discrimination plaintiffs appears in some recent Rule I1 opinions. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Hilton
Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir. 1989); Dickens v. Children's Mercy Hospital, 124
F.R.D. 209, 211 (W.D. Mo. 1989). Nonetheless, a panel of the Second Circuit explicitly
refused to accord special treatment under Rule 11 to civil rights litigation or to attorneys
who represent poor or minority clients. Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1280-81. Somejudges have
exhibited little solicitude for, and even hostility toward, such suits and lawyers. See, e.g.,
Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1083-84; infra note 227 and accompanying text.
220 See Vairo, supra note 192, at 200-01, 232-33; supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text; cf supra note 190 (discussing history and antiquated nature of notion).
221
See supra note 191 and accompanying text (Court pronouncements); supra notes
81, 91, 95, 97-98 and accompanying text (Congressional legislation).
222
See supra notes 20, 168-91 and accompanying text (basic 1938 understandings);
cf supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text (erosion of understandings).
223
Vairo, supra note 192, at 232; cf. Marcus, supra note 12, at 436-37, 450-51, 492-93
(implying that undue emphasis on fact pleading could result in dismissals with insufficient regard for merits).
224
Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1086 (Cudahy,J., dissenting). Accord Yancey v. Carroll County,
674 F. Supp. 572, 575 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
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of proof than conventional private cases. Public law litigation is
often premised on unique, relatively untested, or unpopular legal
theories, thus making it peculiarly susceptible to the assertion that it
is frivolous. 22 5 Similarly, many of these cases may be based on lim-

ited factual information, because the relevant data are difficult to
collect, are in the hands of the defendant, or implicate the defendant's mental state and, therefore, can be secured only through discovery. The limited resources of those who pursue public law
litigation and of their lawyers exacerbate these problems. They
have little time or money to conduct investigations, to compile and
analyze information, to research and articulate pertinent legal theories, or to make "ingenious and sophisticated" arguments that will
successfully repel requests for sanctions. 22 6 For instance, a district
judge "assessed nearly $54,000 in sanctions against Julius Chambers, director of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
22 7
Fund."
Judicial application of Rule 11 may be chilling civil rights litigation, although this is an extremely controversial issue. The practically routine nature of Rule 11 motions by defense counsel in civil
rights cases may dampen plaintiffs' enthusiasm to pursue these
claims, and members of the "civil rights bar [view themselves] as the
primary victims of Rule 11 ."228 The threat of satellite litigation
over, much less actual imposition of, sanctions may dissuade litigants from bringing suits and may deter attorneys from accepting
cases that require factual development or involve novel questions of
law. When lawyers file such cases, they may be reluctant to pursue
See id. at 1085-86 (due process is area where "creativity and frivolity sometimes
225
threaten to merge"); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 575
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("first attorney to challenge Plessy v. Ferguson was certainly bringing a
frivolous action, but his efforts... eventually led to Brown v. Board of Education").
See Szabo, 823 F.2d at 1086 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Several circuits have recog226
nized that resource constraints are relevant to sanctions decisionmaking. See Doering v.
Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195-97 (3d Cir. 1988); Muthig
v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 605 (1st Cir. 1988). See also PlausiblePleadings, supra note 192, at 643-48 (more discussion of ideas in text). The Third Circuit Task
Force stated that its "speculations about civil rights plaintiffs prompt us to urge that
more attention be given to the possibility that the amended Rule has a disproportionately adverse impact on the poor." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at 72.
227
See Rule 11 Boomerang, supra note 198; Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1391
(E.D.N.C. 1987). Another judge recently imposed a one million dollar sanction on a
non-profit legal organization. See Giving Law Teeth (And Using Them on Lauyers), N.Y.
Times, Mar. 17, 1989, at B4, col. 2.
228
See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871 n.4 (5th Cir. 1988)
(quoted language drawn from memorandum prepared in connection with national project mentioned supra note 199); Vairo, supra note 192, at 217 (Rule 11 aggressively invoked against civil rights plaintiffs); cf.Mary Anne Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90.
99 (3d Cir. 1988) (counseling against Rule's routine invocation); TASK FORCE REPORT.
supra note 192, at 60, 72 (sharing some concerns of civil rights bar about Rule 11 but
finding that sanctions motions not routine in civil rights cases in Third Circuit).
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new or unusual legal theories or to advocate with adequate vigor
2 29
their clients' causes because of the threat of sanctions.
Certain difficulties with Rule I l's application arose despite the
protestations of the Advisory Committee and some courts; other difficulties mean that the gravest fears of the amendment's critics may
be realized. 23 0 The Committee recognized the possibility for abuse
of Rule 11 and expressly disavowed any intent to "chill an attorney's
enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing legal or factual theories," 2 3 1 yet
these problems apparently have materialized.2 32 Notwithstanding
the Committee's suggestion that pleaders could continue to file
without information only available upon discovery, 23" some courts
have effectuated the "Catch 22" that the amendment's opponents
feared most by reading Rule 11 in ways that require greater specific23 4
ity in pleading.
Finally, it is important to remember that the material above is
premised on reported cases and, thus, may be skewed or represent
the tip of the iceberg. Courts have imposed sanctions in many situations without reported opinions, while in other instances the threat
of sanctions may have been used informally to cajole, discourage, or
bludgeon certain litigants and attorneys.2 35 Indeed, a number of
lawyers who litigate public law cases believe that Rule 11 constitutes
an ongoing threat to their efforts, while specific anecdotes involving
229 See Nelken, supra note 197, at 1340-44; Vairo, supra note 192, at 214, 217; Plausible Pleadings,supra note 192, at 643, 648.
230 Critics feared most the "Catch-22," mentioned supra note 214 and accompanying
text and infra note 234 and accompanying text. See Vairo, supra note 192, at 220; Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1561 (11 th Cir. 1987) (discussion of other concerns of
critics, such as chilling adversarial zeal); Nelken, supra note 197, at 1338-39 (same).
231 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note on 1983 amendments, reprinted in
97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983); see also Nelken, supra note 197, at 1339 (additional, related
statements of the then-Committee chair and then-Reporter). Numerous judges have
subscribed to these propositions. See, e.g., Thomas, 836 F.2d at 885; Donaldson, 819 F.2d
at 1561.
232 See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text. The actual chilling effect, like
informal threats to impose sanctions, is difficult to document. See infra note 236. See
generally Tobias, supra note 192, at 503-06 (review of relevant information concluding
that insights of informed observers, reasonable inferences drawn from Rule 11 experience to date, and accumulating anecdotal evidence show that there has been some chilling and considerable likelihood of recurrence).
233 See advisory committee note, supra note 231, 97 F.R.D. at 198-20 1; see also Plausible Pleadings,supra note 192, at 634-35.
234 See Vairo, supra note 192, at 220; supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
235 See supra note 197 and accompanying text (difficulties in relying on unreported
opinions). The assertion as to the threat of sanctions is premised on conversations with
members of the public interest bar. For an example of a threat that was carried out in
the context of Rule 16, see infra note 240 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit
Task Force observed that "approximately sixty percent of the total Rule 11 iceberg and
two thirds of the sanctions iceberg do not appear on the screen," but warned that data
for one year in one circuit were a "weak base for drawing inferences in other parts of the
country." See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 192, at 59.
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threats to impose sanctions abound. 23 6
The considerations mentioned above also pertain to judicial application of the other 1983 amendments. Few reported cases implicate Rule 26 apparently because attorneys have resolved their

discovery problems with Rule

37.237

Rule 26, however, does war-

rant future examination as discovery is quite important to much
public law litigation. Those who pursue public interest litigation
often lack data that government and industry possess, while those
who bring mass tort cases frequently need information about defendants' behavior only available through discovery. 23 8 Moreover,
the discretion Rule 26 grants judges to tailor discovery to the needs
of the case and to the resources of the litigants could affect public
interest litigants, because they will nearly always have fewer resources, and greater need for information, than their opponents. 23 9
There has been a number of reported cases under Rule 16 governing pretrial conferences-but too few to reveal meaningful patterns. Rule 16 determinations are likely to be peculiarly fact-specific
and of limited value, absent a full understanding of the issues at
stake, while much judicial activity under Rule 16 is discretionary and
of low visibility. The courts' activity can have important implications for public interest litigants, as when judges offer suggestions
regarding settlement that range from polite recommendations to
less than subtle demands. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently
found that Rule 16 did not authorize a district judge to hold an attorney in criminal contempt for refusing to submit his client's civil
rights action to a non-binding summary jury trial. 240 Thus, judicial
236 See supra note 228 and accompanying text (civil rights bar views itself as principal
victim of Rule 11). The anecdotes were gleaned from conversations with members of
the public interest bar. The exact nature of the threats and specific incidents are difficult
to document, because suggestions that sanctions may be imposed can be quite subtle
and because civil rights lawyers are understandably reluctant to jeopardize relationships
with judges before whom they must subsequently appear. The study mentioned, supra
note 199, may ameliorate some of these problems. See generally Tobias, supra note 192, at
501-02 (more discussion of these issues).
237
See FED. R. CIv. P. 37.
See Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and
238
Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 549, 572 (1979) (public interest litigants lack data); cf. supra
note 161 and accompanying text (mass tort cases).
239 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Cf The SummayJudgment Rule, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17,
1987, at D2, col. 1 (observation by Professor Vairo that "it took a lot of time and discovery in the Ford Pinto case to uncover certain incriminating documents").
240
The appellate court stated that Rule 16 was "not intended to require that an
unwilling litigant be sidetracked from the normal course of litigation." The circuit court
observed that the Rule's coercive use could alter the balance struck by Congress and the
Supreme Court "between the needs forjudicial efficiency and the rights of the individual
litigant," by, for example, affecting "seriously the well-established rules concerning discovery and work-product privilege." Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886-88
(7th Cir. 1988). But see Homeowners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F.
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activity under Rule 16 warrants future monitoring. Finally,
although Rule 11 implicates issues of litigation financing, those
questions are addressed more directly in three recent Supreme
Court cases.
3. Litigation Financingwith Special Reference to Federal Rule 68
Litigation financing has special significance for public interest
litigants because they generally have relatively meager resources
with which to pursue claims. The Supreme Court has recently applied three Rules-68, 23(e), and 54(d)-which implicate litigation
financing. This subsection will analyze the Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 68 more thoroughly because the issues raised in
its decision resemble those in the case involving Rule 23(e). The
opinion applying Rule 54(d) is simply narrow in scope.
Rule 68 relates to offers ofjudgment or settlement and the payment of costs. 2 4 1 The Rule, which has been amended minimally
since its adoption in 1938, is intended to facilitate settlement and to
minimize prolonged litigation by requiring a plaintiff who rejects a
timely pretrial settlement offer more favorable than the ultimate
judgment to pay post-offer costs. 242 However, Rule 68 "has rarely
Supp. 1343, 1347 n.3 (D. Mass. 1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil Co., 120 F.R.D. 43, 44-46
(E.D. Ky. 1988); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448,449 (M.D. Fla. 1988);
but cf G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v.Joseph Oat Co., 871 F.2d 648, 656-57 (7th Cir.
1989) (appellate court affirmance of sanction imposed on party for failing to send corporate representative to court-ordered settlement conference).
241

See FED. R. Civ. P. 68. See generally 7 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL

PRACTICE ch. 68 (1984) (analysis of the Rule from a private law perspective); 12 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 3001-05 (1973)

(same); Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1985) (analysis of the
Rule from a private law perspective including thorough evaluation of recent proposed
amendments); Silverstein & Rosenblatt, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: The Application of
Rule 68 to Awards of Attorney's Fees in Civil Rights Litigation, 16 CONN. L. REV. 949 (1984)
(analysis of the rule from a public law perspective).
242

Rule 68 reads:

At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow
judgment to be taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. If
within 10 days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offer
and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a
proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the
costs incurred after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made
but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to another has been determined by verdict or order or
judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains to be determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an
offer of judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made
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been invoked and has been considered largely ineffective as a means
of achieving its goals."' 243 Nonetheless, the Advisory Committee recently proposed amending the Rule and the Supreme Court recently applied it in ways that could significantly affect public law
244
litigation.
The chief reason for Rule 68's perceived failure has been that
throughout most of the Rule's existence judges and lawyers considered the term "costs" to exclude attorneys' fees. 24 5 The small
amount at stake-court costs, filing fees and the like-discouraged
parties' invocation of the Rule. 24 6 Thus the Advisory Committee,
responding to increased dissatisfaction with the desuetude into
which Rule 68 had lapsed and to the "litigation explosion," proposed amendment of the Rule in August 1983.247 That proposal
explicitly included reasonable attorneys' fees in post-offer costs and
expenses2 48 and specified that courts might reduce the sum awarded
if they found expenses to be "excessive or unjustified under all of
the circumstances. " 2 49 Moreover, the proposed Rule expressly excluded from its purview class actions, a device important to pursuit
250
of some public law litigation.
before trial if it is served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days
prior to the commencement of hearings to determine the amount or extent of liability.
243
See proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee note on 1983 Amendment,
reprintedin 98 F.R.D. 363, 363 (1983).
244
The analysis below differs from that of other Rules. It considers the Advisory
Committee's work, provisions of the United States Code pertaining to fee-shifting, and
the relationship among the Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress with respect
to Rule amendment. However, analysis of all of these is meant to enhance understanding of their interrelations and should afford insights for future work on the Rules.
245 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Silverstein & Rosenblatt, supra note 241, at 956.
246 See proposed advisory committee note, supra note 243, 98 F.R.D. at 363. Another reason identified for the Rule's disuse was that it "is a 'one-way street,' available
only to those defending against claims ..
" Id.
247
Committee on Rules of Practice& Procedure of the JudicialConference of the United States,
PreliminaryDraft of ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339,
353, 361-67 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Proposal]. The reasons for amendment are in a
document prepared by the Chairman and Reporter of the Advisory Committee. See W.
MANSFIELD & A. MILLER, PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF RULE 68: BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM 8 (1984) [hereinafter BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM].
248
"[Tlhe offeree must pay the cost and expenses, including reasonable attorneys'
fees .... " Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 68 advisory committee note, reprinted in 98 F.R.D. at
353.
249
See id. at 366. Use of the word unjustified was meant to "permit the judge to
deny expenses altogether when, because of circumstances (for example, the ... importance of the issues ('test case') ... an award basically would be unfair." Id.
250
See 1983 Proposal,supra note 247, 98 F.R.D. at 363. Class actions were excluded
because the offeree's rejection would "burden a named representative-offeree with the
risk of exposure to heavy liability for costs and expenses that could not be recouped
from unnamed class members [which] could lead to a conflict of interest between the
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The 1983 proposal was very controversial and provoked sharp
criticism from public interest litigants. 25 1 They primarily feared that
implementation of proposed Rule 68 could have a chilling effect on
civil rights litigation, either deterring its initiation or forcing premature, deficient settlements of actions that were commenced. Critics
perceived the revision as a threat to the continuing operation of the
Congressionally-adopted and Supreme Court-approved dual standard for shifting fees in civil rights cases. Under this dual standard,
prevailing plaintiffs ordinarily recovered attorneys' fees, but successful defendants normally did not.2 52 Opponents contended that

application of the 1983 proposal could require public interest litigant plaintiffs who lost, and even those who prevailed, to assume
post-offer attorneys' fees. 25 3

Granting the judiciary discretion to

decrease fee awards failed to ameliorate these difficulties, because it
was impossible to predict whether courts would choose to exercise
such discretion. The amendment would force plaintiffs to estimate
relatively early in a case, and often with too little data to make a
sufficiently informed determination, the precise value of a settlement offer and exactly how a court might ultimately rule under the

named representative and other members of the class." Proposed FED. R. Civ. P. 68
advisory committee note, 98 F.R.D. at 367.
251
I rely most here on Burbank, Proposalsto Amend Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 424 (1986); Silverstein & Rosenblatt, supra note 241; Simon, supra
note 241.
252
For example, the Senate Report accompanying the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), stated that successful plaintiffs "should
ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust" and that successful defendants should recover fees only when plaintiff's
litigation was "clearly frivolous, vexatious or brought for harassment purposes." See S.
REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976). Congress in passing such fee-shifting
legislation meant to encourage vigorous private enforcement of civil rights laws and
pursuit of new, complex legal theories which facilitate development of constitutional
and statutory law. See id. Some of that legislation is not in the civil rights area. See
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 44-46 (1985) (Appendix to opinion of Brennan, J., dissenting) (comprehensive compendium of fee-shifting legislation). The Court placed its imprimatur on the dual standard in several important opinions. See International
Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S. Ct. 2732, 2735 (1989); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 n.2 (1983); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 421 (1978); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
253
See Simon, supra note 241, at 14-16; Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 55, at 1074,
1076-77 n. 12; Silverstein & Rosenblatt, supra note 241, at 963. The lack of predictability
attributed to the proposal's phrasing and to the advisory committee note were sources
of difficulty. For instance, the 1983 Proposal, 98 F.R.D. at 361, spoke of an offer to settle
for the "money or property or to the effect specified in [the] offer," while defendants
typically make offers in monetary terms. Thus, would a judge rule in favor of a plaintiff
who, having rejected a $500 settlement offer, is "unable to prove actual damages at trial
and recovers only nominal damages of $1, but who nevertheless demonstrates the unconstitutionality of the challenged practice and obtains an injunction?" Marek, 473 U.S.
at 32 n.48 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Fiss, supra, at 1080.
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25 4

proposal.
The Advisory Committee withdrew its 1983 proposal and issued a second one in August 1984.255 The second proposal would
have granted judges substantial discretion to impose appropriate
sanctions, including attorneys' fees, when courts found that a settlement offer "was rejected unreasonably, resulting in unnecessary delay and needless increase in the cost of litigation. ' 25 6 Thus, the
1984 revision was intended to respond to certain criticisms of the
existing Rule and of the earlier proposal by importing amended
Rule 1l's sanctioning concepts. 2 57 Nonetheless, the 1984 version
provoked many of the same criticisms as its predecessor, while creating some additional difficulties of its own.2 58 Most importantly,
the possibility that public interest litigants could be held responsible
for post-offer attorneys' fees meant that the potential for chilling the
25 9
initiation and continuation of public law litigation remained.
The difficulties raised by the two rejected Advisory Committee
proposals to revise Rule 68 could be realized with a 1985 Supreme
Court decision. In Marek v. Chesny, 260 the Court considered the interrelation of Rule 68 and the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards
Act of 1976.261 That statute, in recognition of the need to facilitate
meritorious civil rights litigation and of the resource disparities
among litigants, permits prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorneys'
254
See Silverstein & Rosenblatt, supra note 241, at 964; cf Marek, 473 U.S. at 32-33
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's application of Rule 68 because it would
have similar effects). Critics maintained that these problems could dissuade public interest litigants from commencing suits or lead them to settle prematurely for inadequate
relief, chilling effects in direct contravention of Congressional policies reflected in feeshifting statutes. See Silverstein & Rosenblatt, supra, at 962-65; Simon, supra note 241, at
14-16. Many other criticisms were lodged at the proposal. Some critics asserted that the
process values inherent in public law cases are so important that thejudiciary should not
attempt to influence settlement in these suits in any way. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra
note 55, at 1085-90; Simon, supra, at 65-68, 75, 85; cf Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea orAnathema?, 99 HARv. L. REV. 668, 672 (1986) ("wholly inappropriate" to
resolve "public law disputes in ADR systems that are totally divorced from courts").
255
See Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, PreliminaryDraft of ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, reprinted
in 102 F.R.D. 430, 432-37 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Proposal]. See also Simon, supra note
241, at 16-19, 28-53 (helpful analysis of the 1984 proposal).
256
See 1984 Proposal,supra note 255, 102 F.R.D. at 433.
257
See supra notes 196-236 and accompanying text.
258
For example, although the 1984 proposal placed more discretion in thejudiciary
with explicitly enumerated factors to guide the discretion's exercise, those changes did
not necessarily afford public interest litigants greater certainty. See Simon, supra note
241, at 28-53 (thorough critique of the specific features of the 1984 version).
259
See id. at 18-19, 40-44.
260
473 U.S. 1 (1985). For analysis of Marek and its implications, see Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoingthe Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 575 (1986); Simon,
The New Meaning of Rule 68: Marek v. Chesny and Beyond, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 475 (1986).
261
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
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fees from defendants. The Supreme Court majority found that Rule
68 "costs" included attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Fees Act
and under other fee-shifting legislation which define costs to encompass such fees. Thus, "civil rights plaintiffs-along with other
plaintiffs who reject" offers more favorable than their eventual recovery at trial will not be entitled to attorneys' fees for services rendered after they reject such offers.2 6 2 The Court maintained that
"merely subjecting" those who pursue civil rights cases to Rule 68's
settlement provision would not "curtail their access to the courts or
significantly deter" them from filing actions while declaring neutral
26 3
the Rule's "clear policy of favoring settlement of all lawsuits."
The majority acknowledged that the application of Rule 68 in this
context would require civil rights "plaintiffs to 'think very hard'
about whether continued litigation is worthwhile." 26 4 Nevertheless,
the Court found this effect of the Rule compatible with policies reflected in fee-shifting statutes because under those measures the degree of success secured is the most significant determinant in
265
awarding fees.
Justice Brennan's dissent identified numerous possible adverse
implications of the majority's reading of Rule 68 for public law litigation and public interest litigants. 26 6 He criticized the majority for
employing Rule 68's mechanical approach which merely compares
the defendant's offer and the plaintiff's judgment. The majority's
substitution of that rigid formulation for the Civil Rights Fees Act's
discretionary inquiry into what is a reasonable fee in light of all pertinent considerations-an undertaking characterized as "acutely
sensitive to the merits of an action and to antidiscrimination policy" 26 7 -inevitably would "require the disallowance of some fees
that otherwise would have passed muster." 2 68 Justice Brennan asserted that interpreting the existing Rule to encompass attorneys'
fees would create numerous skewed incentives to settle which directly conflict with the intent of Congress: 26 9 that "private attorneys
general," who seek "vigorous enforcement of modern civil rights
Mare, 473 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 10.
264
Id. at 11.
265 See ide
266
Id. at 15. Justice Brennan reiterated a number of the criticisms directed at the
two advisory committee proposals because the effects of their adoption would have resembled those of the majority opinion.
267 Id. at 29 (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762 (1980)).
268 Marek, 473 U.S. at 30. For example, the plaintiff that recovered "only slightly
less than the proposed amount in settlement" would be automatically prevented from
recouping fees, even if plaintiff had secured " 'excellent results' in litigation that [would]
have far-reaching benefit to the public interest." Id.
269 Id. at 33-34.
262
263
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legislation" and appear "before the court cloaked in a mantle of
public interest," not "be deterred from bringing good faith actions
270
to vindicate" fundamental civil rights.
One helpful example of the chilling effect and uncertainty that
could be engendered by the majority's approach is afforded in the
dissent's reference to the existing Rule's ten day time limit on acceptance or rejection of settlement offers. 2 7' This time limit encourages a defendant who has violated the law to make low offers
early in the litigation before a plaintiff can secure through discovery
the requisite information to evaluate the strength of the case and the
offer's reasonableness. These factors could force the plaintiff to accept an inadequate settlement, without being able to make an informed judgment, because of the great risk of having to assume
72
automatically all post-offer attorneys' fees. 2
The extant Rule's requirement that courts ascertain whether
plaintiff's judgment was more favorable than defendant's settlement
offer provides an equally troubling example. Defendants typically
phrase settlement offers in monetary terms. Public interest litigant
plaintiffs generally seek non-pecuniary, injunctive, or declaratory relief holding that certain procedures, practices, or policies of the defendant violate the Constitution or a .statute. Monetary damages
may be insignificant or irrelevant to these plaintiffs. Thus, judges
will have to perform the complex tasks of quantifying any nonpecuniary relief that a plaintiff secures and of comparing it to defendant's monetary settlement offer. Justice Brennan observed that
the "uncertainty in making such assessments surely will add pressures on a plaintiff to settle his suit even if by doing so he abandons
an opportunity to obtain potentially far-reaching non-monetary relief-a discouraging incentive entirely at odds. with Congress'
intent." 273
The Supreme Court's reading of Rule 68 could inhibit public
interest litigants and public law litigation. The majority's interpretation, by producing uncertainty regarding attorney fee awards, may
adversely affect public interest litigants, because their relative lack of
resources makes them risk averse. Even if the litigants are not de270 l at 32 (citing S. REP. No. 1011, supra note 252, at 4-5 (1976) and H.R. REP. No.
158, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976)).
271
Marek, 473 U.S. at 32.
272
Id at 32 n.48.
273
Id. Indeed, the Marek majority's use of a monetary example to illustrate its reasoning may evince indifference to these problems as well as a lack of appreciation for the
significance of non-monetary relief. See id. at 11. The Court recently has, however, exhibited concern about the difficulties and appreciation for the importance of non-monetary relief. See Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 109 S.Ct.
1486, 1492-94 (1989); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939, 945 (1989).
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terred from commencing suits, they may feel constrained to settle
prematurely. This interpretation could chill precisely that type of
activity which Congress sought to promote by enacting fee-shifting
legislation: the institution, and vigorous pursuit, of litigation seeking to enforce civil rights statutes, to vindicate important principles,
public policies, and values which are not readily reducible to monetary form, and to challenge violations of the Constitution and
2 74
statutes.
The Supreme Court has similarly applied other Rules which implicate litigation financing. In Evans v. JeffD.,275 the Supreme Court
analyzed the interrelation of the Fees Act and Rule 23(e), which requires judicial approval of decisions to compromise, dismiss, or settle class action litigation. 2 76 The Court's ruling allowed trialjudges
to approve settlements conditioned on plaintiffs' agreement to
waive their attorneys' fees. 2 77 The majority relied partially on
Marek's explicit rejection of the argument that civil rights cases
ought to be treated differently from other civil suits for settlement
purposes 278 while observing that preclusion of fee waivers could
have the effect of "forcing more cases to trial, unnecessarily burden279
ing the judicial system, and disserving civil rights litigants."
Justice Brennan, again in dissent, echoed some of the concerns
he articulated in Marek and raised certain others. 28 0 He stated that
274 In a recent "case of first impression," a district judge stated that plaintiff, over
defendant's vigorous opposition, established that the "long standing practice of Philadelphia's police officers... of engaging in warrantless searches of liquor licensed establishments, was unconstitutional," and commended counsel for achieving an
"outstanding level of success." Nonetheless, plaintiff, who rejected a $15,000 settlement offer and recovered a jury verdict of $740, was denied post-offer attorneys' fees.
See Lawrence v. City of Philadelphia, 700 F. Supp. 832, 835-36 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Several
circuits have found that Rule 68 does not require prevailing civil rights plaintiffs to pay
defendants' post-offer attorneys' fees. See O'Brien v. City of Greer's Ferry, 873 F.2d
1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1989); Crossman v. Marcoccio, 806 F.2d 329, 333-34 (1st Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987). See generally Macklin, supra note 260 (discussing

post-Marek judicial application of Rule 68); Simon, supra note 260 (same).
275
276

475 U.S. 717 (1986).
FED. R. Civ. P. 2 3 (e). This provision states:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court
directs.

Id.
277

475 U.S. at 737-38 ("It is not necessary to construe the Fees Act as embodying a

general rule prohibiting settlements conditioned on the waiver of fees in order to be
faithful to the purposes of that Act.")
278 Id. at 732.
279 Id. at 736-37. The Court did acknowledge, however, "that decisions by individual clients to bargain away fee awards may, in the aggregate and in the long run, diminish lawyers' expectations of statutory fees in civil rights cases." Id. at 741 n.34.
280 See id. at 743 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

1989]

PUBLIC LA W LITIGATION

allowing negotiated fee waivers would contravene Congress' purpose of providing economic incentives to attract competent attorneys for victims of civil rights violations who otherwise could not
afford lawyers, thereby enabling the potential plaintiffs to act as
" 'private attorneys general,' vindicating the public interest." 28
Permitting civil rights defendants to condition settlement on a
waiver of statutory attorneys' fees would diminish lawyers' expectations of recovering fees and their willingness to represent civil rights
plaintiffs, making it more difficult for victims of discrimination to
secure counsel. 2 82 These disadvantages could result, because fee
waivers actually will affect lawyers alone. Most potential plaintiffs
lack funds to pay attorneys' fees, so lawyers must rely exclusively on
the Fees Act for remuneration. Plaintiffs, however, have no incentive to seek statutory fees and, therefore, may waive them in return
for substantive relief. Justice Brennan cautioned that defendants
will routinely demand fee waivers in future offers to settle civil rights
cases and that the cumulative impacts of this practice would be to
reduce the number of lawyers willing to accept civil rights cases and
to make it more difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to secure counsel. 28 3 Thus, Evans and Marek might have certain synergistic effects:
potential plaintiffs will file fewer civil rights cases, while the already
284
miniscule percentage of suits tried will decline.
Id at 745.
Id at 754-55.
Id at 758-59. But cf City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 586 nA (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring) (aware of no empirical study showing aggrieved persons have
difficulty securing counsel in civil rights cases).
See Resnik, supra note 3, at 532. Additional recent Supreme Court cases on attor284
neys' fees that do not involve the Federal Rules could have adverse effects on public
interest litigation profound as those of Marek or Evans. See, e.g., International Federation
of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 109 S.Ct. 2732, 2736 (1989) (prevailing Title VII plaintiff
can only recover attorneys' fees against intervenor whose "action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation"). Rhodes v. Stewart, 109 S.Ct. 202 (1988) (summary
reversal of attorney's fee award because civil rights plaintiff cannot be prevailing party
when case rendered moot); Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean
Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987), 478 U.S. 546 (1986) (multipliers of lode star fee to compensate for assuming risk of loss impermissible under typical fee-shifting statute and specifically inappropriate in litigation under the Clean Air Act to enforce consent decree).
The Court has evinced somewhat greater solicitude for public interest litigants in
other fee cases. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 S.Ct. 2463 (1989) (eleventh amendment does not proscribe enhancement of fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against state
to compensate for delayed payment); Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School Dist., 109 S.Ct. 1486, 1493 (1989) (rejection of requirement that civil rights
plaintiff must win litigation's central issue to be prevailing party under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S.Ct. 939, 944 (1989) (contingent fee contract
does not impose automatic ceiling on civil rights plaintiff's attorneys' fee award under
42 U.S.C. § 1988). The Court's ambivalence has been exacerbated by a clear lack of
solicitude in other substantive and procedural rulings in the civil rights and employment
discrimination areas issued just this term. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.
Ct. 2363 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T, Inc., 109 S.Ct. 2261 (1989); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.
281
282
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The Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Crawford Fitting Co. v.
J. T. Gibbons, Inc. 285 could have some similar, albeit more limited, impacts. In CrawfordFitting, the Court held that the federal courts lack
discretion under Rule 54(d) 28 6 to award prevailing parties expert
witness fees that exceed the thirty dollars per day prescription in287
cluded in Section 1821 of Title 28 of the United States Code.
Justice Marshall, in dissent, argued that the majority's approach
contradicted Rule 54(d)'s language and history. He also contended
that its ruling was "ill-advised as a policy matter," because victorious litigants, who have incurred great expense due to the "unavoidable necessity of [procuring] expert witness testimony to establish
or rebut" legal claims, should be able to invoke judicial discretion to
recover such cost. 2 88 This rationale applies with special force to
most public interest litigants, who have more need for, and less ability to pay, such experts than most litigants. Public interest litigants
may lack scientific or technical information that the government

has28 9 or may lack the "in-house" expert capabilities that industry
290

possesses.
In sum, the Supreme Court's application of these three Rules
implicating litigation financing could detrimentally affect public interest litigants and may chill public law litigation. It is too early to
ascertain the ultimate effects of the Court's rulings. 29 ' Certain considerations, such as why individuals and attorneys choose to forgo
suit, are very difficult to document. Nonetheless, it does appear that
uncertainty generated by Marek and disincentives fostered by Evans
may have deterred potential plaintiffs from undertaking public law
Ct. 2180 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989). But see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989).
285
482 U.S. 437 (1987).
286
FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) ("costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party"
except when expressly provided for by statute).
287
28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982) states, "a witness shall be paid an attendance fee of $30
per day .. "
288
Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 450.
289
See supra note 238. Environmental public interest litigation provides a typical
example.
290
Most mass tort and sophisticated product liability litigation as well as much employment discrimination litigation require substantial "outside" expertise. It is interesting to note that the companion case in Crawford Fitting involved an employer's request
for $11,807 in witness fees from unsuccessful plaintiffs who alleged racial discrimination. See Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 439.
291
In Evans, 475 U.S. at 765-66, Justice Brennan, in dissent, offered several
remedial suggestions, including the possibility of Congressional action. Cf Phillips v.
Allegheny County, 869 F.2d 234, 239 (3d Cir. 1989) (suggesting that if civil rights defendants abuse Rule 23(e), plaintiffs should timely raise with district judges who can
employ managerial judging); N. ARON, supra note I, at 129 (urging amendment because
of adverse impacts on public interest litigants of Evans and Marek).
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litigation. 2 92 Moreover, some district and circuit judges rely upon
Crawford Fitting to limit witness fee awards even in civil rights cases
when fees are sought pursuant to fee-shifting legislation. 293 Thus,
as experience accumulates with lower federal courts' application of
these Rules and with the practices of lawyers, parties, and potential
litigants under the Rules, it should become easier to discern any adverse impacts on public interest litigants. 29 4
4.

The PartyJoinderAmendments with Special Reference to Federal
Rules 19 and 24

The Federal Rules' party joinder provisions appear in Rule 19
(covering compulsory party joinder), Rule 23 (governing class actions) and Rule 24 (regarding intervention). 29 5 All three were included in the original 1938 Rules, and each was revised significantly
in 1966.296 This subsection will assess judicial application of Rules
19 and 24 in greater depth. Rule 19 is one of the few Rules that
courts have applied in a way that dearly benefits public interest litigants, although such application has been problematic. Most public
interest litigation today involves requests to intervene under Rule
24 filed by regulated entities, public interest litigants, or the government. Correspondingly, Rule 23 has engendered such controversy
since 1966 that analysis of its judicial implementation may not yield
trustworthy conclusions. Nevertheless, this subsection will treat
Rule 23's application briefly.
a. FederalRule 19. Rule 19 governs compulsory joinder of parties.
292 These assertions are gleaned from conversations with public interest litigants.
For a sense of the post-Marek difficulties that can arise under Rule 68, see Spencer v.
General Electric Co., 706 F. Supp. 1234, 1240-44 (E.D. Va. 1989); Lawrence v. City of
Philadelphia, 700 F. Supp. 832, 835-36 (E.D. Pa. 1988). Cf. Phillips, 869 F.2d at 235-40
(same as to post-Evans difficulties under Rule 23(e)). But cf id. at 239 (not come to
court's attention that civil rights defendants have persisted in demanding fee waivers).
293 See, e.g., Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 867 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1989); Glenn v.
General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1988); Boring v. Kozakiewicz,
833 F.2d 468, 474 (3d Cir. 1987); Central Delaware Branch, NAACP v. City of Dover,

123 F.R.D. 85, 94-95 (D. Del. 1988).

294 For example, numerous civil rights attorneys apparently have been able to avoid
the potential effects of Evans by followingJustice Brennan's suggestion that they "obtain
agreements from their clients not to waive attorney's fees." Evans, 475 U.S. at 766.
Recent theoretical work shows that fee-shifting can disproportionately affect those who

are risk averse. See, e.g., Rowe & Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, 51 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1988); Rowe, Predictingthe Effects of
Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAw & CoNTrEMP. PROBS. 139, 164-70 (1984).
295
See FED. R. Civ. P. 19, 23 and 24. See generally Bone, supra note 3 (helpful analysis
of their histories); Kaplan, supra note 46 (same).
296 See Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEo. LJ. 1204 (1966); cf
Kaplan, supra note 46 (Reporter's analysis of original Rules, ostensible reasons for
amendment, and revisions made).
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The Rule asks whether absentees-individuals or entities not initially made parties to the litigation-should be added to ensure a
fair resolution of the case. 2 97 Absentees are needed for just adjudication when the entities have an interest in the suit that could be
adversely affected by resolution without them or when continuing
2 98
without them could detrimentally affect those already parties.
When a court determines that an absentee is needed for just adjudication, the judge must ascertain whether joinder is feasible, an inquiry which entails consideration of subject matter jurisdiction,
service of process and venue. 2 99 If the court finds joinder feasible,
the absentee "shall be joined as a party in the action. '3 00 When
joinder is infeasible, the court must decide whether in "equity and
good conscience" the plaintiff's case should proceed without absentees or should be dismissed.3 0 ' The considerations explicitly provided in Rule 19(b) guide this determination: the plaintiff's need
for a forum in which to pursue relief, the potential for prejudice to
absentees' interests if the litigation continues without them, the defendant's concern that it not be exposed to multiple or inconsistent
suits or responsibilities, and the interest of the public in efficacious
resolution of controversies as well as additional factors that may be
302
relevant to equity and good conscience.
Much public interest litigation implicates Rule 19. For example, the Sierra Club recently challenged the National Park Service's
procedures for issuing permits to mine in Alaska's national parks;
the Club did not sue miners who had already secured permits.3 0 3 A
substantive decision favorable to the Sierra Club could have jeopardized these miners' interests. The litigation raised two questions
under Rule 19: first, did the Rule require that the absentee miners
be brought into the litigation because their joinder was feasible?;
and second, if joinder were not feasible, should the Sierra Club's
297
See generally Freer, Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal
Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061 (1985) (analysis of Rule 19 from a private law perspective); Tobias, supra note 77 (analysis from a public law perspective).
298
Factors relevant to ascertaining whether absentees are needed for just adjudication are in subsections 19(a)(1), (a)(2)(i) and (ii). See Tobias, supra note 77, at 774-78 &
nn.144-77 (analysis of these factors and their application).
299
FED. R. Cxv. P. 19(a); see Tobias, supra note 77, at 778-79 & nn.178-80 (analysis of
the "joinder limitations").
300
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).
301 FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b); see Tobias, supra note 77, at 779-92 & nn. 181-255 (analysis
of that decision).
302
See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). The characterization of the stated considerations is
derived from the Supreme Court's formulation in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust
Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-12 (1968). See Tobias, supra note 77, at 779-92 &
nn. 181-255 (analysis of factors relevant to equity and good conscience).
303
See Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, No.J85-009 Civ. 2-3 (D. Ala.July 24,
1985), aff'd on othergrounds, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986).
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claim proceed without the absentees or should it be dismissed? The
judge who tried this case, and courts hearing numerous other public
law suits, have resolved these difficult party joinder issues by creat'30 4
ing a "public rights exception.
The public rights exception affords public interest litigants a forum in which to vindicate public rights by allowing plaintiffs' suits to
continue without requiring joinder of absentees whose interests
could be adversely affected by resolution in their absence. An important concomitant of the exception's application, however, has
been the dearth of judicial concern for absentees' interests-interests that can be prejudiced substantially. In the worst case scenario,
courts may have adjudicated absentees' interests without their having notice of the litigation.3 0 5 In public law cases pursued during
the last several years, large numbers of absentees, which had invested significant sums on preparing for contemplated natural resource exploration and development in reliance on governmental
representations that the exploration and development were proper,
were not ordered joined at the trial court level. 30 6 When public interest litigants convinced trial judges of the impropriety of governmental activity pertaining to absentee exploration and development,
the courts effectively halted those operations. Accordingly, absentees have had to expend substantial resources on protracted litigation and even may lose all of their investments on exploration and
30 7
development, should their contentions ultimately be rejected.
Thus, federal judges have applied a public rights exception
which facilitates public interest litigants' pursuit of their cases. Federal courts, out of apparent solicitude for plaintiffs' forum needs-a
concern clearly and strongly expressed in Rule 19(b)-may have neglected an equally explicit and weighty concern in the same subsection, minimization of prejudice to absentees. 30 8 Even when judges
See id(See also Tobias, supra note 77, at 759-60 & nn.75-76 (listing cases in which
304
the exception was applied) and at 759-69 & nn.75-123 (analysis ofjudicial articulation of
the exception). The classic formulation which appears in half the opinions is: "when
litigation seeks the vindication of a public right, third persons who may be adversely
affected by a decision favorable to the plaintiff do not thereby become indispensable
parties." See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 324 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (quoting
Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 929 (1 1th Cir. 1982)).
305
See Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988); National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271, 275-77, aff'd on rehearing,676 F. Supp. 280, 283-84 (D.D.C.
1986), aff'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
306 See, e.g., Conner v. Burford (absentees allegedly invested millions of dollars exploring for oil and gas on public lands which they may be unable to recoup).
307
The Ninth Circuit's "modification" of the district court's order apparently was an
attempt to be responsive to these considerations in Conner v. Burford. See 836 F.2d at
1541.
Most courts justify their application of the exception by appeals to public policy,
308
such as governmental accountability for decisionmaking. See, e.g., id. at 1540-41 (con-
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applying the public rights exception appear to resolve properly the
compulsory party joinder question, it remains difficult to ascertain
positively whether the courts correctly conducted the inquiry envisioned by Rule 19.309 The uncertainty created by unclear judicial
treatment has hampered absentees' planning while engendering
prolonged litigation, wasting scarce private and public resources,
310
and eroding the courts' credibility.
b. FederalRule 24(a)(2). Rule 24(a)(2) governs non-statutory intervention of right. 31 ' It provides that, upon submission of a timely
request, an absentee with a sufficient interest in the "property or
transaction which is the subject" of the suit that could be adversely
affected if the case is resolved without it shall be permitted to inter3 12
vene, unless existing parties adequately represent its interest.
Thus, the concept of interest is integral to Rule 24(a)(2); it appears
cern that "death knell" for "judicial review of executive decisionmaking" not sound and
that two environmental statutes be enforced); cf Tobias, supra note 77, at 764-65 (discussion of other justifications).
309
The difficulties with these cases lie primarily in what courts omitted, assumed, or stated unclearly ....Moreover, it is often difficult to ascertain
whether judges followed the rule's steps in resolving the joinder question, and a few judges apparently ignored or even violated the rule's explicit commands. Indeed, it is impossible to discern what some judges
applying the exception in fact did.
Tobias, supra note 77, at 769.
310
These problems do not necessarily mean that judges resolved thejoinder
issue erroneously. Indeed, a number of courts apparently made correct
decisions and certainly effectuated rule 19's weighty concern for plaintiffs' forum needs. However, the reader ofjudicial opinions invoking the
public rights exception cannot positively determine if most of the courts
reached appropriate conclusions.
Id.

As this Article was in press, the Supreme Court issued an opinion interpreting Rule
19 in ways that could disadvantage public interest litigants. See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.
Ct. 2180 (1989). The Court permitted white firefighters, who claimed that they had
been adversely affected by a consent decree governing employment practices between
black firefighters and the City of Birmingham, Alabama, to challenge that decree in subsequent, separate litigation. The Court reasoned that it was preferable to require plaintiffs, such as the black firefighters, to join under Rule 19 anyone who could be practicaly
prejudiced by the litigation, rather than require that absentees intervene under Rule 24.
It is too early to discern all of Wilks" potential implications; however, the decision may
disadvantage public interest litigants by, for instance, requiring that they incur great
expense identifying and joining large numbers of absentees.
311
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). See generally Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before
Courts, Agencies and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968) (analysis of the Rule principally from a private law perspective); Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right-Toward a
New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 894 (1980) (same); Jones, Litigation
Without Representation: The Needfor Intervention to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 HARV. C.R.-

C.L. L. REV. 31 (1979) (analysis from a public law perspective). I have not analyzed the
application to public law litigation of Rule 24(a)(1), governing statutory intervention of
right, because it is comparatively straightforward or of Rule 24(b), governing permissive
intervention, because it is more discretionary, an easier case, and less instructive.
312

FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
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explicitly in three requirements and implicates the fourth. The concept of interest is important to public interest litigants because they
represent large numbers of unorganized people, such as the poor,
who individually have interests that may appear relatively insubstantial, or they seek to vindicate comparatively intangible interests like
that of the general public in clean air.
Much public interest litigation involves issues of intervention of
right. In the case in which the Sierra Club questioned National Park
Service procedures for issuing permits to mine in Alaska's national
parks, the court ordered that the miners holding permits receive notice and an opportunity to request intervention in the apparent belief that they were entitled to intervene as of right in the lawsuit. 313
Correspondingly, public interest litigants often seek to intervene in
litigation challenging governmental activity pursued by regulated
entities, like energy companies.
Numerous courts have technically applied Rule 24(a)(2)'s four
requirements to intervention requests of both private applicants and
public interest litigants. Some courts have created presumptions as
to the requirements' satisfaction or have developed judicial glosses
on, or tests for, the requirements, which do not appear in the rule's
text or in the Advisory Committee Note. Such treatment apparently
reflects the Rule's essentially private law focus and a similar approach of the courts, which has adversely affected public interest
litigants, both as plaintiffs and as potential intervenors. 31 4
Nearly all courts read Rule 24(a)(2) to require that applicants
submit timely intervention requests, show that they have the requisite interest in the pending litigation, demonstrate that resolution
without them will impair their interests, and show that existing parties inadequately represent those interests. Moreover, most judges
demand that prospective intervenors clearly satisfy all four of these
requirements.
A number of circuit and district court judges has interpreted
technically or narrowly the interest component of Rule 24(a)(2), 3 15
See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
When public interest litigants have sought to intervene in suits involving private
interests and the government, the public interest litigants have enjoyed less success than
private interests seeking to intervene in litigation public interest litigants have pursued
against the government. Thus, public interest litigants have lost the opportunity to protect interests important to them, while the litigation they have brought has been complicated by the entry of absentees. This subsection emphasizes public interest litigants'
requests to intervene, because their resolution poses greater difficulty.
315
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). The Rule speaks of an interest "relating to the property
or transaction which is the subject of the action." The very language, "interest in the
property," bespeaks a private law approach; public interest litigants often seek to vindicate something much less tangible and considerably less private, such as a moral or
aesthetic interest.
313
314
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demanding that potential intervenors have a significant, direct, legally protectable interest. 3 16 Moreover, three Justices of the
Supreme Court recently subscribed to a similar formulation, stating
that Rule 24(a)(2)'s "requirement of a 'significantly protectable interest' calls for a direct and concrete interest that is accorded some
degree of legal protection." 31 7 A number of lower federal court
judges have imposed even more stringent requirements, speaking in
terms of an interest which the "substantive law recognizes as belonging to or being owned by applicants" 31 8 or demanding that potential intervenors possess interests equal to, or exceeding, that
3 19
required for standing.
Two recent Seventh Circuit opinions illustrate these restrictive
approaches. One case involved an action brought by the United
States to condemn private property for inclusion in the Congressionally authorized Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore. 3 20 The court
denied intervention to a public interest group-with a thirty-year
commitment to the creation of the Lakeshore, whose members had
lobbied successfully for the legislation and used the area and which
asserted that the government had abandoned acquisition effortsbecause the organization lacked the only two legal interests the
court treated as relevant in eminent domain proceedings. 3 2' The
court stated:
While the Council's aesthetic and environmental interest in Cres316 See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452,
463 (5th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom. Morial v. United Gas Pipe Line, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984)
(Rule 24(a)(2) requires a direct, significant, legally protectable interest in property or
transaction subject of the action); Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir.
1982) (intervention of right requires direct, substantial, legally protectable interest in
proceeding); Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 700 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1983)
(intervention prohibited when interest founded on what potential intervenors regard as
enlightened public policy not legally protectable interest in contract at issue).
317 Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 71, 75 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring,
joined by Justices Rehnquist and Burger).
318 Athens Lumber Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 690 F.2d 1364, 1366 (Ilth Cir.
1982); accordHeyman v. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 615 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir.
1980).
319
See United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, sub. nom. Save the Dunes Council, Inc. v. United States, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986)
(exceeding standing); Southern Christian Leadership Conference v. Kelley, 747 F.2d
777, 779 (1984) (equal to standing). Cf Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213
(11th Cir. 1989) (ifjusticiable case and controversy between parties, applicant need not
demonstrate standing, although standing cases relevant to defining type of interest must
assert). See generally Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986) (reserving for future
decision question whether potential intervenor initially must satisfy standing).
320 See 36.96 Acres of Land 754 F.2d 855.
321
"An eminent domain proceeding ... considers only two legal interests. The first
interest is that of the sovereign to exercise the power of eminent domain ....
The
second interest in an eminent domain proceeding is one of private ownership- essentially the ownership of the condemned property." 754 F.2d at 858.
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cent Dune may indeed be legitimate and demonstrable, we cannot
say that it is direct, substantial or legally protectable. Therefore,
the Council's interest in ("guaranteeing the preservation of [Crescent Dune's] natural beauty,") ... for public use is not the type of

3 22
interest which justifies intervention under Rule 24(a).
In the second case, 323 a public interest organization sought to vindicate its interest in the protection of "unborn" children and its
"members' interest in adopting fetuses 'born alive' after abortions. ' 3 24 The group had been instrumental in securing legislation
favorable to its views. The circuit court found that the group lacked
a "direct and substantial interest sufficient to support intervention"
in litigation challenging the legislation's constitutionality. 32 5 The
court revealed its private law approach by flatly rejecting the proposition that the "interest factor must be broadly construed in public
32 6
law cases where public interest organizations seek intervention"
and by concomitantly observing that "Rule 24(a) precludes a conception of lawsuits, even 'public law' suits, as necessary forums for
32 7
such public policy debates" as those over abortion.
The second intervention requirement asks whether the "action
may as a practical matter impair or impede" the prospective intervenor's ability to protect its interest if the case proceeds in the applicant's absence. 3 28 Much of the above analysis of the interest
requirement applies here. For example, the type of general, collective, or intangible "public" interests-like those in environmental
quality or wilderness preservation-which public interest litigants
typically champion, will less likely appear prejudiced as a practical
matter than an individual, palpable, "private" interest, such as that
in a contract. Thus, even when judges read the impairment requirement rather flexibly, finding sufficient the potential stare decisis effect
of a judgment in an applicant's absence, that interpretation benefits
public interest litigants less than those representing private
3 29
interests.
Rule 24(a)(2)'s third condition requires potential intervenors to

Id. at 859.
See Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Illinois Pro-Life
Coalition v. Keith, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
324
764 F.2d at 1271.
322
323

325
326
327

Id. at 1269.

Id at 1268.
Id at 1270. See American Nat'l Bank & Trust v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 144,
146-48 (7th Cir. 1989) (recent summarization of Seventh Circuit jurisprudence).
328
See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
329
Cases permitting intervention by private interests because industry members satisfy the practical prejudice condition are more the rule. Correspondingly, decisions allowing intervention by public interest litigants because they have met the requirement
are more the exception. Compare Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear
Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1978) and Natural Resources Defense
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demonstrate that parties to the litigation do not adequately represent their interests. 33 0 A number of courts has been more willing to
find the government a sufficient representative of public interest litigants than of private interests. The most stringent test, applied by
some judges, requires that prospective intervenors, with purposes
similar to the government litigant, prove collusion between the government litigant and other parties to the case, prove nonfeasance on
the part of the government, or prove adversity of interest between
the applicant for intervention and the government. 33 ' Numerous
courts employ a presumption of adequacy when one party is a governmental entity responsible for representing the public, the public
interest, or interests of the potential intervenor. 33 2 Moreover, a
growing number ofjudges has premised the determination of adequacy of representation on the notion of the parenspatriae developed
in other contexts-the government is assumed to represent the interests of all citizens of the state.3 3 3 Application of the parenspatriae
label, however, begs the question of adequacy of representation.
The terminology and results in several recent cases reveal the detrimental impact on public interest litigants of the application reviewed and unclear judicial thinking. In those decisions, judges
found that the government would be a sufficient representative of
public interest litigants that sought to champion "public interests,"
but the courts indicated or implied that the government could not
adequately represent "private interests" asserted by others, such as
33 4
industry.
Intervention's fourth requirement is timeliness. Rule 24(a)(2)
Council, Inc. v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977) with Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v.
Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983).
330
See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
331
See, e.g., Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1133, 1135 (3d Cir. 1982); Liddell v.
Caldwell, 546 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
332
See, e.g., United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1986);
Keith, 764 F.2d at 1270; cf. United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141, 144 (lst Cir.
1982) (applying this presumption and the test appearing in the text accompanying note
331 supra); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 98 F.R.D. 11, 16-17, 26 (E.D. Tex. 1982) (same).
333
See generally United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 98487 (2d Cir. 1984) (clear, comprehensive exposition of the parenspatriaenotion, as developed in other contexts, and a thorough compilation of cases).
334
See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d at 144 (government adequate
representative of public interest group because group "asserts essentially the public interest rather than a personal interest" but inadequate to protect the interest of "private
proprietors"); cf. Keith, 764 F.2d at 1270 (public interest litigant's assertion of essentially
"personal" interests insufficient to intervene); Westlands Water Dist. v. United States,
700 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1983) (public interest litigant's interest founded on "enlightened public policy" insufficient to intervene). Courts have occasionally found the government an adequate representative of private interests. See, e.g., Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. New York Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 834 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.
1987).
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merely states "upon timely application," and the Advisory Committee Note is silent on what timeliness means.3 3 5 Nonetheless, many
courts have embellished the requirement by developing four factors
to consider in determining whether application is timely:
(1) the length of time the prospective intervenor knew or reasonably should have known of its interests before it petitioned to intervene, (2) the prejudice to existing parties due to the failure to
petition for intervention promptly, (3) the prejudice the prospective intervenor would suffer if not allowed to intervene, and (4)
the existence of any unusual circumstances militating either for or
3 36
against intervention.
The development and application of the four considerations adversely affect public interest litigants. For example, private interests, such as regulated entities, have considerable time and money
to monitor governmental activity that affects their interests, so they
will know about litigation important to them. In contrast, the resource constraints of public interest litigants make it less likely that
they will be aware of litigation implicating their interests and even if
they are, it may be impossible to ascertain whether the relief entered
will affect them. Indeed, public interest litigants have not learned of
litgation's institution in certain cases involving compelling substan33 7
tive issues, such as affirmative action,
In short, the treatment of requests to intervene as of right
R. Civ. P. 2 4(a)(2); FED. R. Civ. P. 24, advisory committee note, reprinted in
39 F.R.D. 109 (1966); see Note, The Timeliness Threat to Intervention of Right, 89 YALE LJ.
586 (1980) (analysis of timeliness).
336
United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d at 143-44; accord Grubbs v. Norris, 870
F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989); Chiles v. Thomburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (lth Cir.
1989); Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264-66 (5th Cir. 1977); EEOC v.
United Air Lines, 515 F.2d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 1975). Judicial development of the four
factors and others may be justified on the basis of the Supreme Court's admonition that
a trial court's timeliness determination is to be premised on consideration of "all the
circumstances." NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365 (1973). Nonetheless, it is unclear why these factors were developed, when the Advisory Committee explicitly included some of them in Rule 24(b). Moreover, the factors essentially ask courts to
reexamine certain matters that they expressly considered under the initial three requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) or were implicated in that treatment. This reexamination is particularly detrimental to public interest litigants, for example, because the nature of the
interests they represent will make the interests themselves and prejudice to those interests appear insignificant, especially in contrast to other interests, such as industry
interests.
337
See Jones, supra note 311, at 43, 79-86 (cogent analysis of this problem in the
affirmative action context); BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 30, at ch. 4 (discussion of
the resource constraints). For helpful, recent examples of the timeliness problems that
can arise in related types of public law litigation, see United States v. City of Chicago,
870 F.2d 1256, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1989); Grubbs, 870 F.2d at 345-46; Chiles, 865 F.2d at
1213. Ironically, the Supreme Court recently intimated that public interest litigants
might file subsequent, separate suits challenging consent decrees resolving litigation in
which they did not intervene. See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
335

FED.
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under Rule 24(a)(2) reflects the private law phrasing of the provision and concomitant judicial thinking. Despite the admonitions of
two of this nation's pre-eminent jurists, who advocated flexible,
pragmatic application of Rule 24 to "other than traditional litigation," 3 38 some judges have applied the Rule to public law litigation
as if it were private litigation, while a number of courts has employed narrow, technical, or rigid approaches, creating unwarranted
presumptions, glosses, or tests. 339 Judicial opinions offer relatively
few explicit justifications for these interpretations, although courts
may want to temper the litigation explosion, to achieve efficiency or
to manage more effectively complex litigation, by limiting the
3 40
number of parties.
Such judicial treatment has had numerous adverse implications
for public interest litigants. The relative ease with which those that
represent "private" interests have gained access to public interest
litigants' cases has complicated the litigants' ability to control their
suits, and has increased their costs by delaying resolution of
claims. 34 ' More importantly, the comparative difficulty that public
interest litigants have encountered seeking intervention has had significant effects. When courts reject these entities' requests to intervene, the potential parties forfeit the valuable opportunity to
participate in litigation that could adversely affect interests they consider significant, with concomitant losses in governmental accounta338
United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 983 (2d Cir.
1984) (Judge Friendly's recent admonition and example of flexible, pragmatic application); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 699-704 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Judge Leventhal's similar treatment).
-339 Such treatment appears attributable substantially to the Rule's private law focus
and concomitant judicial application. This does not necessarily mean that the results
reached were incorrect or imply that the Rule was applied improperly, although these
could be expected given the numerous grounds on which denial of intervention can be
premised. Moreover, some courts, such as the ninth circuit, have applied Rule 24 in
ways that are more responsive to public interest litigants. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v.
Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 308-10 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635,
637-39 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 825-29 (9th Cir.
1986), rev 'don othergrounds sub nom., Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480
U.S. 370 (1987); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 417-20 (D. Minn.
1972).
340
For discussion of these and other justifications, see Bethune Plaza, Inc. v.
Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 530-34 (7th Cir. 1988); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 98 F.R.D. 11, 21-23
(E.D. Tex. 1982). For additional reasons, see supra notes 320-27 and accompanying
text.
341
An "intervention of right ...may be subject to appropriate conditions or restrictions responsive among other things to the requirements of efficient conduct of the proceedings." FED. R. Civ. P. 24, advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. at I11. Such
restrictions are rarely imposed on "private" intervenors. See Siring/ellow, 480 U.S. at 380,
381-83 (Brennan, J., concurring) (analysis of implications of restrictions for intervenors
of right); PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, COURT AWARDED FEES IN "PUBLIC INTEREST" LITIGATION chs. 7, 23 (1978) (discussion of public interest litigants' costs).
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bility and in public acceptance of governmental activity. 34 2 In some
circumstances, particular individuals or entities may be wholly unrepresented, while certain viewpoints may remain unarticulated.
The denial of these intervention applications may deprive the federal judiciary of information, arguments, or perspectives it needs to
make the best decisions. The considerations have special significance when the courts perform the exceedingly complex and delicate task of fashioning relief in institutional reform litigation,
requiring the input and cooperation of all affected people, groups,
and entities. 3 43 Judges are generalists, and courts and government
litigants may not have adequate resources or the requisite expertise
in certain fields, such as science or economics. Moreover, the government has no monopoly on what constitutes the public interest or
on how to represent it most effectively in specific contexts. Indeed,
the Rule as written, and as applied by a number of courts, may reflect an increasingly impoverished vision of considerable recent federal civil litigation and perhaps what it should represent in a modem
34 4
democratic society.
342 See, e.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452,
473-75 (5th Cir.) (Williams,J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Morial v. United Gas Pipe
Line, 469 U.S. 1019 (1984) (in litigation deciding how much consumers will pay for
electricity, consumers "must be allowed to participate [because] potent impact upon
them"); Northern Alaska Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1986) (National Park Service admitted violating National Environmental Policy Act and own regulations when approving mining in Alaska's national parks). For analysis of public
accountability for and the acceptability of government decisions, see Cramton, The Why,
Where and How of BroadenedPublic Participationin the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 572
(1973); Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
1403, 1422-24 (1983).
343 For example, individual institutional members, such as school teachers and
prison guards, may have the best appreciation of the institutions in which they work and
be uniquely situated to frustrate practical implementation of decrees by refusing to cooperate. Indeed, some public law cases involve controversial, and even volatile, issues
like abortion and school desegregation, as to which emotions run high and there has
been violence. In those situations, it is especially important to allow those who must
"live with" the decision an opportunity to participate in its formulation. See Note, Institutional Reform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE LJ. 1474 (1982).
See also Thornburg, Litigating,the Zero Sum Game: The Effect of InstitutionalReform Litigation
on Absent Parties, 66 OR. L. REV. 843, 877-79 (1987).
344 For discussion of one vision of considerable recent federal civil litigation, see
supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text. Public values increasingly are the subject of
adjudication in the modem state, because the courts, like the political branches, may
provide an important forum for debate on issues of public moment. See Chayes, Public
Law Litigation, supra note 2; Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 55. For instance, it now
could be unfair to relegate public interest entities that have won hard-fought victories in
the political branches solely to the vicissitudes of government representation of their
interests in litigation challenging those successes. E.g., Keith v. Daley, 764 F.2d 1265
(7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Illinois Pro-Life Coalition v. Keith, 474 U.S. 980 (1985);
United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom.
Save the Dunes Council, Inc. v. United States, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986). Indeed, it may be
disingenuous to so relegate a public interest group that pursued relief from the "polit-
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c. FederalRule 23. Rule 23, governing class actions, provides that a
case can proceed as a class suit when the class is so numerous that
joinder is impracticable, when the potential claims of the class members share common characteristics, when the person prosecuting
the litigation has a claim typical of the class, and when that person is
an adequate representative of the class members.3 45 The class action device is the quintessential mechanism for pursuing public law
litigation. Nonetheless, the class action has had such a checkered
and controversial career since the 1966 amendment of Rule 23 that
any attempt to draw conclusions about its judicial application is
fraught with difficulty.3 4 6 Professor Arthur Miller has observed that
the bench and bar overused and abused class actions during the second half of the 1960s, that the period from approximately 1969 to
1974 witnessed considerable narrowing and some overreaction by
the courts, and that the subsequent half-decade saw stabilization
34 7
both in attorneys' use and judicial application of the device.
Moreover, during the 1980s, there has been a dramatic decrease in
the number of class action suits filed, most precipitously in the area
3 48
of civil rights.
Judicial narrowing of the mechanism's use, courts' reticence to
certify class actions, and uncertainty regarding fee awards engendered by cases like Evans,3 4 9 apparently have contributed to this decline.3 50 Indeed, the Supreme Court's application of Rule 23 in
certain contexts illustrates the difficulties inherent in following an
essentially private law approach to the Federal Rules. Professor
Chayes has argued that the Court has treated "class representatives
and members as classical individual claimants" for purposes of analyzing issues of notice, amount in controversy, authority of repreical" branches of government at judicial instigation or out of the group's possible concern for issues ofjudicial "equity, comity and federalism. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 379 (1976). See generally Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 700 F.2d 561, 563
(9th Cir. 1983) (public interest litigant's concerns respecting public policy on water use
"should be addressed to the Executive or Legislative branches"). See also Sunstein, supra
note 158, at 477 (odd to suggest that regulatory beneficiaries of Congressional statutory
schemes must return to political process to remedy administrative illegality).
345
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The class action has inspired voluminous literature. See

generally S.

YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLAss AcTION

(1987); Garth, Nagel & Plager, The Institution of the PrivateAttorney General: Perspectivesfrom
an EmpiricalStudy of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353 (1988); Class Actions and
Private Attorneys General, 62 IND. LJ. 497 (1987).
346
See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussion of the 1966 amendment);
Miller, supra note 103 (discussing the controversy over Rule 23); In re A.H. Robins Co.,
Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 729-38 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing controversy).
347
See Miller, supra note 103, at 676-82.
348 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
349
Evans v.Jeff. D, 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
350 See Class Actions, supra note 164.
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sentatives, and standing.3 5 1 These rulings may have arbitrarily
limited operation of the class device as a mechanism for enforcing
constitutional and statutory policies at the federal and state
levels.3 5 2 Correspondingly, Professor Abraham has stated that the
Court's Rule 23 interpretations have impeded plaintiffs' efforts to
invoke it and precluded a "considerable amount of federal class action litigation in mass tort cases." 3 55
5.

A Miscellany of Additional Rules

Judicial application of several other Rules apparently has adversely affected public interest litigants. The enforcement of the
Rules-71, 60(b)(5), 52 and 56-will be explored briefly in this
subsection.
Rule 71 states that when a court order is entered on behalf of
someone not a party to the suit, that individual can enforce obedience to the ruling as if the person had been a party.3 54 Certain public law litigation, such as school desegregation cases, can implicate
the Rule when children or parents who did not participate in the
initial suit assert that the school district is violating a decree entered
in that litigation.3 5 5 Some judges apparently have applied private
law rationales when interpreting Rule 71, demanding that those
who seek to invoke it satisfy requirements relating to standing or
intervention, thus narrowly restricting the number of persons who
can pursue relief 3 5 6 For example, the fifth circuit rejected a request
of members of the public, who were not parties to litigation brought
by the federal government to enforce the Fair Housing Act, that a
defendant which allegedly violated an order entered in the earlier
3 57
litigation compensate the citizens.
351
See Chayes, Foreword, supra note 2, at 28 (quotation); id. at 26-45 (remaining ideas
in sentence).
352
See id. at 28. In some situations, however, the Court has recognized class actions'
value as mechanisms for treating "injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government." See Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). Cf
Hazard, Forms of Action Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NomRE DAME L. REv.
628, 640 (1988) (federal courts have treated civil rights class suits more sympathetically
than small claims damage class suits).
353
See Abraham, supra note 160, at 877. Accord Mullenix, supra note 160, at 1047-60.
But cf.In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d at 734 (movement toward Rule 23's more liberal
use in mass tort context).
354 See FED. R. Civ. P. 71; see generally Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiff's
Remedy When a Defendant Violates An Injunction, 1980 U. I"L. L. F. 971 (thorough treatment
of Rule 71).
355 See, e.g., Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 537 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1976).
356
See Rendleman, supra note 354, at 976-78 (analysis ofjudicial treatment and compilation of relevant cases).
357 See Northside Realty Assocs. v. United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1356-58 (5th Cir.
1979).
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Judicial resolution of requests under Rule 60(b)(5) to modify
consent decrees entered in institutional reform litigation has been
related in certain respects to courts' application of Rule 71. 358 This
provision states in pertinent part that courts may relieve parties
from final judgments, orders, or proceedings if"it is no longer equi' 3 59
table that the judgment should have prospective application.
Numerous circuit courts have recently enunciated a standard for altering consent decrees agreed to in institutional reform cases which
is less rigorous than the requirement imposed in other suits, because the "unique nature and demands of institutional reform litiga3 60
tion necessitate a more flexible approach to modification."
These courts state that, although a defendant cannot satisfy the
longstanding standard of "unforeseen change in circumstances" imposed by the Supreme Court in private cases, 3 6 ' courts may permit
modification:
if the defendant (1) can establish some change in circumstances
has occurred from the time the decree was negotiated and approved; (2) convince the court that it has attempted to comply
with the decree in good faith; and (3) asks for a modification that
does not frustrate the original and overall purpose(s) of the decree ....362

Although the complex, delicate nature of institutional reform litigation may warrant somewhat greater flexibility, application of a less
358

FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5); see Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of Third Parties,

87 MICH. L. REV. 321 (1988) (helpful analysis of numerous aspects of consent decrees);
Consent Decrees: PracticalProblems and Legal Dilemmas, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. I (same); cf.
Jost, From Swift to Stotts andBeyond: Modification of Injunctions in the FederalCourts, 64 TEx.
L. REV. 1101, 1105, 1119-21, 1148-51 (1986) (modification motions "nominally
brought" under Rule 60(b)(5) provision which "merely codifies preexisting law" and
helpful analysis of modification in institutional reform context).
359

FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).

Ruiz v. Lynaugh, 811 F.2d 856, 861 (5th Cir. 1987); accord Hodge v. Dep't of
Housing and Urban Dev., 862 F.2d 859, 861-64 (11 th Cir. 1989); Plyler v. Evatt, 846
F.2d 208, 211-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 241 (1988); New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 969-70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915
(1983); Massachusetts Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. King, 668 F.2d 602, 607-08 (1st
Cir. 1981). Cf Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295, 298-301 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (acknowledging more flexible standard and applying similar factors but enforcing them more strictly); Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756, 758-59 (7th Cir. 1985) (suggesting more flexible modification standard).
361
See United States v. Swift& Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932);Jost, supra note 358, at
1107-13 (analysis tracing the development of that standard).
362
Ruiz, 811 F.2d at 861 n.8; accordNew York State Ass'nfor RetardedChildren, 706 F.2d
at 969-70; Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org. v. Shapp, 602 F.2d 1114, 1120-21 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied sub nom., Thornburgh v. Philadelphia Welfare Rights Org., 444 U.S.
1026 (1980). The Supreme Court has issued in one case four differing opinions of a
trial judge's power to alter a "consent decree," although only Justice Blackmun suggested a flexible approach and that was meant to effectuate civil rights litigants' interest.
See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
360
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demanding standard means that those who seek institutional reform
will encounter greater difficulty in securing meaningful relief and
effective consent decrees, especially in retaining decrees. These
complications will be exacerbated by the new Supreme Court opinion which permits third parties who have not intervened in employment discrimination litigation resulting in a consent decree that
allegedly harms them, to challenge the decree in subsequent, sepa3 63
rate litigation.
Rule 52(a) provides that "findings of fact shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witness."3

64

The Supreme Court held that the issue of intent to

discriminate in employment under section 703(h) of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act constitutes a "factual matter subject to the clearly-erroneous standard of Rule 52(a)" in Pullman-Standardv. Swint.3 65 The
effects of the Court's characterization have been to restrict appellate
court inquiry into the state of mind of defendants who allegedly discriminate, thereby protecting those accused of discrimination, and
to limit the procedural opportunities of individuals alleging discrimination, thereby making it more difficult for them to win their
cases. 3 66 The ultimate impact of the Swint ruling remains unclear,
although appellate courts have not restricted its application in reviewing findings of fact regarding discrimination solely to testimonial evidence or to cases arising under section 703(h) of the Civil
3 67
Rights Act.

Rule 56 governs motions for summary judgment. Courts grant
these motions when pleadings, interrogatory answers, admissions,
See Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989). See generally Kramer, supra note 358.
FED. R. Civ. P. 52 (a). See Cooper, Civil Rule 52(a): Rationingand Rationalizingthe
Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 644 (1988) (recent analysis of Rule's
application); Rosenberg,JudicialDiscretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 SYRACUsE L. REV. 635 (1971) (on appellate review).
365 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982); see Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standardsof Appellate Review in DisparateTreatment Cases-Limitingthe Reach of Pullman Standard v. Swint, 58
TuLANE L. REV. 403 (1983) (analysis of Swint); Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 840, 9981005 (1984) (same).
366 See Resnik, PrecludingAppeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 617-19 (1985) (analysis
contending that those phenomena extend broadly beyond the context of Swint); Resnik,
supra note 365 at 1004-05 (same).
367 See Calleros, supra note 365, at 408; Resnik, supra note 365, at 1004. Cf Scotts v.
Memphis Fire Dept., 858 F.2d 289, 295-96, 303 (6th Cir. 1988) (appellate court reversal
of trial judge's factual finding of pattern of intentional discrimination even under Swint's
clearly erroneous standard). But cf.Walsdorf v. Board of Comm'rs for East Jefferson
Levee Dist., 857 F.2d 1047, 1053 (5th Cir. 1988) (appellate court reversal of magistrate's factual finding of no intentional discrimination even under Swint standard). See
also Cooper, supra note 364, at 665-66 (some circuits facilitate more searching review of
findings of intent to discriminate under clearly erroneous rubric by insisting on detailed
findings).
363
364

334
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and affidavits "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." 3 68 For many years, the federal courts exhibited considerable
reluctance to grant summary judgment motions, particularly in complex cases.3 6 9 During 1986, however, the Supreme Court encouraged the lower federal courts to grant such motions more
liberally in what has been dubbed the "trilogy"- Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc.,370 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,371 and Matsushita Electric IndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp.3 7 2 One writer who surveyed the federal
judiciary's application of summary judgment soon after issuance of
the trilogy had difficulty ascertaining the overall effect of the procedural mechanism's expanded use. 3 73 Nonetheless, her review indicated that courts were granting summary judgment more freely than
before in certain types of public law cases, especially those involving
civil rights and employment discrimination.3 74 Public interest litigants may be affected adversely by the Court's general suggestion
that lower federal courts grant summary judgment more readily and
by the Court's specific failure to separate the idea of predicting the
trial record from the notion of sufficiency of the evidence. 3 75 The
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
See Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A CriticalAnalysis, 83 YALE LJ. 745,
745-46 (1974); Vairo, Through the Prism: Summary Judgment and the Trilogy, 3-I1 (unpublished manuscript Nov. 1987). The leading Supreme Court cases contributing to this
development were Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), and Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
570
477 U.S. 242 (1986).
371
477 U.S. 317 (1986).
372
475 U.S. 574 (1986). See Nelken, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: SummaryJudgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 54 (1988) (helpful look at post-Celotex developments
in lower courts and suggestions for future treatment of summary judgment); Risinger,
Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: A Summary Judgment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to SummaryJudgment, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 35 (1988) (analysis of trilogy especially
as could be applied to civil rights cases); Vairo, supra note 369, at 15-29 (analysis of the
trilogy).
373
See Vairo, supra note 369, at 41.
374
See id. at 30-40. Professor Vairo listed more cases in each category granting or
affirming summary judgment than cases denying or reversing it. Of course, the numbers
were relatively small, so more time must pass before very reliable conclusions can be
drawn. For a recent example of an appellate court's summary affirmance of a district
judge's grant of summaryjudgment against a civil rights plaintiff, see Herrera v. Millsap,
862 F.2d 1157, 1160 (5th Cir. 1989). Cf Healy v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 860 F.2d 1209 (3d
Cir. 1988) (appellate panel affirmance of summary judgment in age discrimination case
over dissent contending improper under Celotex and Anderson). Some courts, such as
certain panels of the Third Circuit, have been more solicitous of plaintiffs in these cases.
See, e.g., Todaro v. Bowman, 872 F.2d 43, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1989); Levendos v. Stem Entertainment, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1988); Watson v. City of Kansas City,
857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
375
As to the general suggestion, Professor Vairo found that most circuit and district
court judges clearly "have taken the Supreme Court's message to heart" and are "actively encouraging" summary judgment motions. Vairo, supra note 369, at 30; see, e.g.,
Knight v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
368
369
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Court's conflation of these two concepts could result in a procedure
which invariably benefits defendants. Regardless of which party
moves for summary judgment, the plaintiff must tender proof which
justifies a prediction of the record; this demand requires the plaintiff
to assemble essentially the entire case and reveal much of that case
to the defendant, although the defendant has no similar obligation.
In sum, the federal judiciary's application of numerous Rules
has been problematic for public interest litigants. Most of this treatment involves the Rules as applied, not written, and poses particular
difficulties for public interest litigants, often disproportionately affecting them. Thesejudicial interpretations also appear to have had
cumulative impacts on public law litigation. For example, a number
of developments may have the synergistic effect of chilling public
law suits, especially civil rights cases.3 7 6 Although the precise nature of such application and all of its ramifications cannot be discerned, they are sufficiently clear to support the suggestions for the
future which follow.
III
SUGGESTIONS FOR

A.

THE

FUTURE

Preliminary Conclusions and Suggestions for the Short
Term
1. Preliminary Conclusions

Nearly all of the problems for public law litigation and for public interest litigants identified involve judicial application of the Federal Rules, although a few difficulties appear attributable to the
Rules as written. 37 7 The problems cluster primarily around timing
932 (1987); see also Risinger, supra note 373 (thorough discussion of the Court's specific
failure to separate the two concepts).
376 Judicial application of Rules 8, 11, 68, and 23 could have that effect. Numerous
other assertions could be posited, especially premised on the material above and the
preliminary conclusions below, see infra notes 377-78 and accompanying text. This Article indicates that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Courts have applied the
Rules as observed for unclear reasons. Some justifications have been afforded in opinions or seem obvious, such as the litigation explosion. Others, which have not been
articulated, probably range across a broad spectrum from inadvertence to insensitivity
and even hostility toward public interest litigants. I certainly do not mean to suggest
that the federal judiciary systematically set out to eliminate, or even to limit public law

litigation. All I am saying is that courts applied the vast majority of Rules that I analyzed

in ways that disadvantaged or disproportionately affected public interest litigants when
most of the rules were susceptible to multiple, equally plausible interpretations.
377 For example, the difficulties with Rule 24(a)(2) result both from judicial application and the phrasing of the provision. Although flexible application of the Rule as
written could solve most problems observed, the Rule was widely acknowledged to have
been "flawed in the amending." See, e.g., Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under
Rule 24, 57 Ky. LJ. 329, 374 (1969); Shapiro, supra note 311, at 757-64; Shreve, supra
note 311, at 920 n. 110; cf Jones, supra note 311, at 48-86 (suggestions for amending rule
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of acquisition of information, litigation financing, partyjoinder, and
remedy formulation. 3 78 They also implicate issues of judicial case
management, efficiency, and economy and of attorney responsibility
as well as notions of "disfavored" litigation and of potential chilling
effects on public interest litigants. These preliminary conclusions
prompt a number of recommendations.
2.

Short-Term Suggestions

The federal judiciary, the Advisory Committee, and the Congress should consider numerous short-term recommendations while
additional information regarding the Rules' application to public
law litigation is collected, analyzed, and synthesized. The federal
courts should apply the Rules with greater solicitude for public interest litigants. Apparent judicial insensitivity to these litigants and
mere inadvertence have created some of the difficulties. Courts
seemingly have decided issues arising under the Rules that involve
the litigants in a piecemeal fashion without reflecting on the cumulative impacts of such determinations.3 79 Judges also have appeared
more concerned about responding to certain problems, such as the
litigation explosion or expeditious resolution of complex lawsuits,
than about disadvantaging public interest litigants. Indeed, some
courts, in apparent haste to achieve more dispositions or to conclude ostensibly "frivolous litigation," may have inadequately considered other important values, such as affording potential litigants
an opportunity to be heard.
Many of the problems created can be ameliorated without
38 0
straining either the language of the Rules or judicial credibility.
24 to accommodate public law litigation better). Cf Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180,
2187 (1989) (suggesting Rule 24(a)(2)'s application in ways favorable to civil rights litigation would require rewriting rather than interpretation).
378
These are not the only areas in which problems cluster or the sole way to classify
the difficulties. For example, the problems could be parsed in terms of timing: pretrial,
trial, post-liability stage, post-judgment. Concomitantly, public interest litigation principally implicates party problems, while institutional litigation primarily involves questions of relief.
379
See supra note 376 and accompanying text; cf. Resnik, supra note 136. at 444
(courts engage in managerial judging with little reflection on cumulative effects for adversary system or specific types of litigation).
380
See, e.g., supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text (suggesting courts abandon
heightened pleading requirements imposed under Rule 8 because they contravene
Rules' letter and spirit and other mechanisms available to achieve similar results); supra
note 377; Tobias, supra note 77 (suggesting courts abandon public rights exception to
Rule 19 because judges can reach equally satisfactory results by applying existing rule
and considering all relevant factors the rule requires to be considered); but see Eisen v.
Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 175-77 (1974) (Rule 23(c)(2)'s notice requirements
cannot be read more flexibly). But cf Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2187 (1989)
(application of party joinder amendments more solicitous of civil rights litigation
"would require a rewriting rather than an interpretation").
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Judges can and should accord flexible and pragmatic interpretations
to the Rules in public law cases. 3 8 ' Courts should also be sensitive
to the special characteristics of public law litigation in contrast to
private law litigation and should recognize the implications of applying the Rules to both types of suits. 3 82 For instance, vindication of
fundamental civil rights and access to the civil litigation process are
values many believe more significant than judicial economy. Correspondingly, courts ought to think imaginatively about ways of accommodating public law litigation without sacrificing important
goals like expeditious dispute resolution. Courts could do so by applying mechanisms currently provided in numerous Rules, by employing the techniques tailored to specific types of litigation in the
Manual for Complex Litigation, or by creating new procedural
38 3
approaches.
Certain of these suggestions also are relevent to the Advisory
Committee's work. It should consider carefully, and provide for,
public law litigation in the normal course of proposing amendments
to specific Rules. Although the Advisory Committee, in the 1983
amendments and in its attempts to revise Rule 68, appeared insufficiently sensitive to public law litigation, the Committee can and
should be more alert to public interest litigants' needs when contemplating future change. For example, it should remember that
Rules which appear neutral can have different, and often dispropor38 4
tionate, impact on these litigants because of resource constraints.
Congress should maintain as much interest in rulemaking, and
See supra note 338 and accompanying text (Judges Friendly and Leventhal cham381
pion flexible application of Rule 24 to "other than traditional litigation.").
382 See supra notes 54-82 and accompanying text (salient characteristics of public law
litigation). Important implications of applying the Rules to public law litigation will be
the potential for disadvantaging public interest litigants because of their comparative
lack of information and resources. See supra notes 251, 341 and accompanying text.
For example, under existing Rule 24, public interest litigants' need to intervene
383
and parties' needs for expeditious dispute resolution can be accommodated by permitting, but conditioning, the intervention. Correspondingly, if the remedial phase of institutional litigation is characterized by numerous parties, issues, and interests, it may be
advisable to import techniques from administrative procedure, such as those used in
notice-comment rulemaking. See generally United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56
F.R.D. 408 (D. Minn. 1972); Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.
J. 38 (1975). For helpful suggestions regarding use of the Manual, see Simons, The Manualfor Complex Litigation, 62 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 493 (1988).
The Committee's attempts to amend Rule 68, as well as the Court's application
384
of that Rule in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), and its reading of the partyjoinder
amendments in Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989), illustrate such potential impact.
Despite both entities' protestations that their efforts were neutral, they ignored the fact
that civil rights plaintiffs challenging state action have vastly fewer resources than defendants. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 531. For an earlier, explicit refusal to take into
account disproportionate effects on litigants with limited resources, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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continue to be as solicitous of public interest litigants, as it has in
recent years. For instance, 1988 legislative branch action modernizing the rulemaking processes will have beneficial consequences.
Congress itself, however, may want to monitor even more closely
judicial application, and Advisory Committee amendment, of the
Rules and should consider modifying specific judicial or Committee
treatment with which it disagrees. For instance, Supreme Court interpretations of the interrelations between several Rules and the
Civil Rights Fees Act may have so eroded Congress' underlying purposes in passing the legislation that amendment might now be
385
appropriate.
B.

Long-Term Suggestions

An important preliminary conclusion about the Rules' application to public law litigation is that we know too little to formulate
definitive conclusions. It would be helpful to have clearer understanding of, and more information about, numerous considerations
relating to the Federal Rules and to public law litigation. With that
knowledge, even the most complex difficulties involving judicial application should be amenable to resolution.
1. GeneralInformation
a. The Rules. A more comprehensive and more refined appreciation of the Rules would facilitate future work. If the "history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve the problems created by the
preceding generation's procedural reforms,"3 8 6 and American
proceduralists essentially tinker with the Rules in a never-ending cycle,3 8 7 the Rules' history assumes considerable importance. Recent
research, although helpful, creates its own difficulty by positing multiple, inconsistent accounts. Thus, these histories warrant attempts
at reconciliation, while new work proceeds on the Rules.
The value choices reflected in the Rules must be explored, because they are crucial to judicial application. Were the 1938 Rules
meant to be trans-substantive, to treat plaintiffs and defendants
more equally, to favor merits resolution after full disclosure through
discovery, to assimilate law into equity, or to increase judicial con385
The Court interpretations are Marek and Evans. Cf Court Upholds Use of Rights
Law But Limits How It Can Be Applied, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1989, at AI, A12, col. 3
(members of Congress will draft and support legislation meant to overturn recent court
decisions on civil rights mentioned supra note 284).
386
Resnik, supra note 365, at 1030.
387
See Marcus, supra note 12, at 494; cf.Stewart, supra note 51, at 1779 (similar ideas
regarding administrative procedure).
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trol?3 8 8 If the answers are affirmative, are they true today, and, if so,
389
what are their implications for modern litigation?
There should be additional work on the Rules as a set of litigating principles and on specific areas of procedure and particular
Rules. For instance, were the partyjoinder Rules as drafted initially,
and even as amended in 1966, premised on a vision of litigation
which involves thousands of geographically dispersed parties and
hundreds of complex issues?3 9 0 If not, is more change now
indicated?
The rulemaking process itself warrants additional work,
although recent Congressional efforts to modernize the procedures
should yield improvements. From that work, a jurisprudence of
rulemaking should be developed. Courts, the Advisory Committee,
and commentators should explore in greater detail whether more
precise Rules can be written; if that proves impossible, what mechanisms could restrain the substantial judicial discretion afforded by
the "general charters that today masquerade as rules"? 3 9 Some recent Advisory Committee activity could have empowered the federal
judiciary at the expense of litigants and Congress.3 9 2 The two abortive attempts to amend Rule 68 illustrate the effects of being insufficiently attentive to institutional responsibilities for rule-amending,
to Congressional policies underlying fee-shifting legislation, and to
393
the polycentric nature of rule-amending activity.
388

Correspondingly, were the 1938 drafters animated by New-Deal reformist ten-

dencies, Realism, and professionalism? The answers probably are all of the above.
389 For instance, if the original drafters favored a strong federal government because they viewed it as beneficent, what does that mean in the modem administrative
state in which government is considered to be "part of the problem" by everyone from
Ronald Reagan to Ralph Nader? Research on the Rules' history might fall within the
ambit of work on the federal courts' history recently authorized by Congress. See H.R.
REP. No. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 5982, 6008-09.
390 Professor Miller persuasively argues that the 1966 drafters may not have contemplated Professor Resnik's "Calder-like configurations we call cases today." See Miller,
supra note 103, at 669-76; see generally Resnik, supra note 3, at 502 n.30. Cf Pub. L. No.
100-702, §§ 201-03, 102 Stat. 4646 (1988) (recent Congressional attempt to treat analogous party problems in mass accident context).
391 Burbank, supra note 35, at 1474; cf Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative
Rules, 93 YALE LJ.65 (1983) (general discussion of difficulty in writing precise Rules).
392 See supra notes 244-59 and accompanying text (Rule 68); Burbank, supra note 251
(same); Burbank, Sanctions in the ProposedAmendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Some Questions About Power, 11 HorsTRA L. REV. 997 (1983) (Rule 11).
393 See supra notes 244-59 and accompanying text (Rule 68 and fee-shifting legislation); Friedenthal, supra note 12 (discussion of institutional rulemaking responsibilities);
Fuller, The Formsand Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 393-405 (1978) (discussion ofpolycentricity). Indeed, the Supreme Court recently acknowledged that rulemaking has been "substantive and political in the sense that the rules of procedure have
important effects on the substantive rights of litigants." Mistretta v. United States, 109
S. Ct. 647, 665 n.19 (1989) (footnote omitted).
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The process of rules revision should receive even greater scrutiny. Professor Lewis recently assessed those procedures and found
that the "current institutional rulemaking machinery is plainly inadequate to the task of initiating needed proposals for the study of
particular rules," and recommended that Congress reexamine the
amendment process and reformulate or revitalize the existing mechanisms to make them more responsive to developments in litigation.3 9 4 Other observers have suggested democratizing the
Committee's composition or the rule-amending process by, for instance, appointing representatives of public interest litigants to the
Committee or employing procedures similar to notice-comment
rulemaking for rule-amending.3 95 In 1988, Congress modernized
the rulemaking procedures, while the Judicial Conference recently
396
has modified certain of its rulemaking processes.
b. Public Law Litigation. Although commentators have undertaken
much valuable theoretical research into public law litigation and certain forms of such litigation now appear institutionalized, there is
compelling need for a more thorough and refined appreciation of
the theory and practice of public law litigation (a public lawjurisprudence). Enhanced understanding would facilitate efforts to ascertain whether the litigation actually differs from private law cases in
significant ways and whether it warrants special consideration under
the Rules.
An attempt should be made to define public law litigation in
terms of numerous salient characteristics. Because one definition
cannot encompass the diverse forms that are included within the rubric of public law litigation, it is preferable to speak of salient or
3 97
defining characteristics of that litigation.
394 Lewis, The Excessive History of FederalRule 15(c) and its Lessonsfor Civil Rules Revision,
85 MicH. L. REv. 1507, 1508-09, 1573 (1987). Another writer even more recently observed that Rule I l's 1983 amendment specifically and rulemaking generally have not
been premised on sufficient data. See Burbank, The Transformationof American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 6, notes 5-10, 83-87 and accompanying
text (forthcoming 1989).
395
For contrasting views of democratization, compare Hazard, supra note 39, at 129 192, 1294 with Lesnick, supra note 152, at 580-81. Cf Burbank, supra note 394, at note 81
(need to expand membership in club and expand activities beyond library); supra note
383 (notice-comment rulemaking procedures).
396
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-74, 2077 (1989) (Congressional modernization); R.
COVER, 0. Fiss &J. RESNIK, supra note 39, at 1810 (recentJudicial Conference modification). See, e.g., Proceduresfor the Conduct of Business By theJudicial Conference Committees On
Rules of Practiceand Procedure, 120 F.R.D. 395 (1988).
397 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 3. A number of these characteristics were examined
above. See supra notes 55-82 and accompanying text. Efforts should continue, however,
to develop others. Cf Abraham, supra note 160, at 849-83 (recent example in mass tort
context).
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Creating some typologies also should be useful.3 9 8 For in-

stance, a typology of parties could be created. It might be helpful to
categorize public interest litigants in terms of the individuals or interests the litigants represent; their areas of substantive expertise,
such as natural resource preservation or consumer protection; or
their principal purposes, such as litigating or lobbying legislatures
3 99

or agencies.
Developing a clearer vocabulary applicable to public law litigation will help judges, lawyers, and litigants talk more intelligently
and intelligibly about the phenomenon. Available sources, such as
judicial opinions and other legal writing 40 0 and work in non-legal
fields, 4 0 1 can provide this vocabulary. A better appreciation of how
certain aspects of public law litigation compare with their analogues
in private law litigation should help to create the vocabulary. For
example, if a dispute about public policy is considered the subject
matter of a lawsuit, while a moral interest is deemed sufficient to
participate in litigation, those concepts are considerably less tangible in public than in private law litigation. 40 2 Other disciplines can
clarify understandings of concepts used imprecisely in law. For instance, conventional wisdom in the fields of political science and
theory has suggested for some time that the "public interest" which
the government claims to represent is best comprehended as consisting of numerous private interests. 40 3 This insight might mean
that under Rule 24 the government should be considered an "adequate representative" of public interest litigants less often than
before. 404 Moreover, it may be worthwhile to create new terminol398
Typologies are classification schemes employing subcategorization. Typologies
could be useful in numerous ways. For example, on a practical level, a more sophisticated understanding of public interest litigants could help judges more effectively resolve Rule 24 intervention requests or construct representational frameworks in
institutional litigation.
399 I realize that certain considerations, such as public interest litigants' resources
and funding sources which may be relevant to some Rules' application, could implicate
privacy concerns. See Boyer, Funding Public Participationin Agen ' Proceedings: The Federal
Trade Commission Experience. 70 GEo. L.J. 51, 102-08 (1981).
400 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 311-44; Chayes. Foreword. supra note 2; Chayes,
Public Law Litigation, supra note 2; Fallon. supra note 3; Fiss, Against Settlement. supra note
55.
401
See, e.g., M. DAN-COHEN. RIGHTs, PERSONS. AND ORGANIZATIONS (1986); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); G. SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST
(1962).
402 Compare the interest considered sufficient to intervene in Sagebrush Rebellion.
Inc. v. Watt. 713 F.2d 525, 527-28 (9th Cir. 1983) with the "property" spoken of in Rule
24, supra note 311.
403 See. e.g., G. SCHUBERT, supra note 401; Gellhorn, supra note 81. at 360 (concern
for the environment, for example).
404 Nonetheless, courts have continued to find the government an adequate representative of public interest litigants that seek to represent the public interest. See supra
notes 330-34 and accompanying text.
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ogy to describe public law litigation. For example, Professor Chayes
coined the term public law litigation in 1976,405 while Professor Fiss
has employed the term structural reform to describe certain types of
institutional litigation. 40 6 It may now be appropriate to develop a
"public law vision" of the Rules-one that simultaneously facilitates
public interest litigants' vindication of important social values and
takes into account the factors the Rules contemplate will be
considered.
A catalog of the advantages and disadvantages of public law litigation should be compiled. 40 7 The very effort to define advantages
and disadvantages may reflect political perspectives. For instance,
public law litigation, which substantially improves the quality of an
Interior Department decision to lease public lands, by affording endangered species of wildlife greater protection, but delays natural
resource development on those lands for three years, could appear
40 8
beneficial or detrimental depending on one's political viewpoint.
Even objectively identifiable advantages and disadvantages can pose
difficulties, such as quantifying them for purposes of comparison.
Nonetheless, there should be more work, especially aiming to identify additional benefits and costs, attempting to assign them weight
in terms of relative importance, and refining understanding of their
meaning.40 9 For example, in litigation between the government and
industry, numerous public interest litigants may have a strong interest in intervening to present their views, while the original parties
41 0
could be as concerned about expeditious dispute resolution.
These conflicting interests might be accommodated by permitting
one public interest litigant to intervene on behalf of all such litigants
or by conditioning the participation of those allowed to
4
intervene. "t
See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2.
See Fiss, supra note 2, at 2.
407
The principal benefit of public law litigation seems to be the improved decisionmaking of governmental institutions, while the principal detriments appear to be disruption of the institutions' operations and delay attributable to litigation.
408
See, e.g., Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988); Northern Alaska
Envtl. Center v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1986).
409 See Brunet, Study in the Allocation of ScarceJudicialResources: The Efficiency of Federal
Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701 (1978) (helpful effort in the context of Rule 24).
410
The judiciary will share these interests in securing information to make the best
decisions and in promptly concluding disputes. Perhaps the best treatment of these and
additional concerns is Judge Friendly's opinion in United States v. Hooker Chems. &
Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984). Cf Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863
F.2d 525, 530-34 (7th Cir. 1988) (helpful analysis of these and related concerns).
411
See Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380, 383
(1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (discussion of analogous possibilities and their benefits
and disadvantages); United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 56 F.R.D. 408, 419-20 (D.
Minn. 1972) (same).
405

406
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There should be attempts to reach more differentiated, refined
understandings of public law litigation, particularly by placing in
context numerous considerations delineated. For instance, public
interest litigation primarily implicates party problems, while institu41 2
tional reform litigation principally involves remedial questions.
Moreover, most public law litigation is imbued with process values,
such as interests in participation and dignity, which means that it
generally will be a less appropriate candidate for settlement than in
4 13
other litigation.
2.

Specific Information

Information on federal civil litigation relevant to public law litigation and to the Rules should be explored. The Annual Reports of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and the efforts
of the Federal Judicial Center provide valuable information and
promising points of departure, although additional sources should
be consulted. 4 14 Some existing work includes general characterizations of the quantity of public law litigation. 41 5 Analysis of the pertinent information, which is tailored to public law litigation, however,
is warranted. For instance, although data are available on the
number of class actions filed annually, relatively little is known
about the type of class actions these are, and class action suits compromise a comparatively small number of public law cases pursued. 4 16 Additional information relating to the following concerns
would help facilitate future work: the Federal Rules under which
problems arise for public literest litigants, why and how the difficul412

These characteristics are not always true. For instance. certain forms of institu-

tional litigation can pose complex party problems involving adequate representation of
affected interests, see Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982),
and the generation of authoritative consent, see Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 55, at
1078-82.
413
See supra note 82 (litigation imbued with process values); supra note 254 (public
law litigation inappropriate candidate for settlement).
414
See T. Willging, supra note 196 (example of recent Rule 11 study conducted
under FederalJudicial Center auspices). The data relied upon in compiling the MANUAL
FOR COMPLEx LITIGATION, SECOND (1985) and those used in completing the American
Law Institute's 1987 PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMPLEX LITIGATION [hereinafter ALI
STUDY] should be helpful. Moreover, Congress recently established a Federal Courts

Study Committee which should generate valuable data. See Federal Courts Study Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 464445 (1988). For helpful discussion of difficulties
entailed in empirical inquiry, see Marcus, supra note 136. at 686-91.
415 Compare Resnik, supra note 3. at 511 ("statistical rarities on the federal docket")
with Fiss. Against Settlement, supra note 55, at 1087 ("probably dominate the docket of a
modem court system"). This discrepancy, however, appears attributable partly to the
definition used.
416 For helpful nascent eflbrts, and suggestions for the future, see Chaves. Public Law

Litigation, supra note 2. at 1303; Simon. supra note 241, at 63 n.286. Cf supra note 164
and accompanying text (class action data).
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ties are created, the frequency with which they occur, the individuals
and entities affected, and how federal courts have addressed the
problems. 41 7 It is equally important to identify considerations pertinent to treatment of the difficulties, especially conflicts between
public interest litigants' full participation in federal litigation and
other goals of the civil justice system, such as judicial economy and
fairness to parties. There should be estimates of the capacity of existing Rules or ancillary procedural mechanisms, such as provisions
of the United States Code, to ameliorate or solve the problems. 41 8
If these measures are found deficient, the difficulties entailed should
be compiled and preliminary surveys of potential solutions ought to
be undertaken.
C.

More Definitive Conclusions and a Look Into the Future

When all of the information is collected and evaluated, more
accurate conclusions in certain areas should follow. A significant
question will be whether public law litigation differs from private
suits in ways that warrant special consideration. At this juncture,
some qualitative dimensions should supplement the quantitative
material. Thus, even if public law cases are "statistical rarities on
the federal docket," 41 9 those suits' importance to the public may
warrant special treatment. This significance may be gauged in terms
of the public's interest in resolving controversial issues of great moment or the litigation's "impact on society and on attitudes toward
the judicial function and role." 4 20 In light of the experience with
the Rules' application described above and conservative prediction
as to the future, public law litigation appears to differ from private
disputes in ways that call for distinctive consideration under certain
42 1
and perhaps all of the Rules.
The more difficult question is what treatment to accord public
417 The analysis of judicial application of numerous Rules in the second section of
this Article could serve as a starting point. For instance, that assessment indicates that
Rules 16, 26, and 56 are promising candidates for future work.
418
The ALI STUDY, supra note 414, at 7, found that the strength and weaknesses of
existing mechanisms afforded a "context for potentially valuable procedural reforms."
419 Resnik, supra note 3, at 511. I am not implying that Professor Resnik downplays
the qualitative dimension.
420
Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 2, at 1303; Fiss, Against Settlement, supra
note 55, at 1087.
421
This conclusion is reasonable, even if the qualitative dimension, mentioned,
supra notes 419-20 and accompanying text, is discounted. Inclusion of the qualitative
element could be criticized as loading the question, although it actually responds in part
to concerns regarding the legitimacy of public law litigation, allowing for negative resolution of the issue on that basis. Cf Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180, 2187 (1989) (refusal to accord civil rights litigation special consideration under party joinder
amendments).
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law litigation.4 2 2 The answer will depend on numerous considerations applicable to specific Rules, to procedural areas, and to the
Rules as a whole. One important set of factors involves the number
and gravity of perceived problems, such as the Rules' language or
judicial application, and the difficulties' amenability to amelioration
or solution. Other relevant considerations include: the political
and practical realities of implementing potential solutions and the
receptivity of entities, such as the federal judiciary, the Advisory
Committee, and Congress, responsible for instituting the requisite
change.
These factors demand specific contextual analyses of variables
relevant to each Rule and procedural area as well as a general overview. For example, problems resulting from deficient phrasing of
Rules can be rectified easily with amendments by the Advisory Committee or by Congress. 4 23 Correspondingly, if the difficulties are attributable to judicial enforcement and courts are responsive to
applying the Rules with increased solicitude for public interest litigants, the solutions should be relatively straightforward. For instance, judges should abandon the "public rights exception" and
apply Rule 19 to resolve the pertinent party joinder question while
drawing on administrative law procedures to create representative
4 24
party frameworks in the remedial phase of institutional litigation.
If, however, the problems are more structural or systemic, in that
the Rules as a set of litigating principles fail to accommodate effectively public law litigation or the federal judiciary is not receptive to
applying the Rules with greater concern for public interest litigants,
more fundamental change, such as promulgating a separate set of
425
Rules for public law litigation, may be indicated.
CONCLUSION

The fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
has afforded an opportune occasion to analyze the federal judici422 Cf ALI STUDY. supra note 414, at 239 (indicating comprehensive solution possible in area of complex litigation).
423
It appears that few such problems will be found. See supra note 377 and accompanying text. Even Rule 24(a)(2), which was widely criticized as flawed in the amending,
has not yet been deemed sufficiently troubling to require consideration of a possible
amendment. Cf Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187 (suggesting application of Rule 24(a)(2)
more favorable to civil rights litigation would require rewriting).
424 See supra note 379 (Rule 19); supra note 383 (representative party frameworks in
institutional litigation).
425 See Martin, 109 S. Ct. at 2187 (indicating Supreme Court's lack of receptivity to
applying Rules with greater solicitude for civil rights litigation); Brazil, supra note 69, at
399-402 (discussion of separate procedural tracks); McGovern, supra note 69, at 478-91
(same); but see Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 55, at 1087-89 (criticism of the two-track
idea).
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ary's application of numerous Rules to public law litigation. The
evaluation indicates that many courts have enforced a number of
Rules in ways that adversely affect public interest litigants. It also
shows that federal judges can and should apply the Rules with considerably more solicitude for public interest litigants as the second
half-century of the Rules' application opens.
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